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FROM THE STATUTE OF ANNE TO Z.Z. TOP: THE STRANGE WORLD OF
AMERICAN SOUND RECORDINGS, HOW IT CAME ABOUT, AND WHY IT WILL
NEVER GO AWAY
BRUCE D. EPPERSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Uniquely among all industrialized nations, the United States extended no
copyright protection to sound recordings until February 15, 1972. Between the
adoption of the Copyright Act of 19091 and the 1971 Sound Recording Act
Amendments,2 only musical compositions submitted to the Register of Copyrights in
the form of sheet music were protected by federal copyright. 3 The individual aural
representation captured for playback on a cylinder, disc, or tape could only be
protected by the common or statutory laws of the individual states. The 1971 Sound
Recording Act Amendments specified that only future sound recordings were subject
to federal protection.4 This feature was carried forward into the comprehensive
revision of the Copyright Act enacted in 1976 and implemented on January 1, 1978. 5
Although Section 302 of the Copyright Act contained a sweeping provision that
brought works created prior to the 1976 legislation under federal protection, pre-1972
sound recordings were specifically exempted by Section 301(c).6
In the 1990s, federal courts in California and Tennessee, relying on language
that was admittedly vague, held that commercially issued pre-1972 sound recordings
were “published.” However, because the Register of Copyright had not issued a
notice protocol (instructions on how the “circle-C” or “circle-P” symbol should be
displayed on the label) until after February 1972, it was impossible for these records

* © Bruce Epperson 2015. Bruce Epperson, P.A., Attorneys and Planners, Ft. Lauderdale,
Florida. B.S., Economics, University of Kansas, 1988; M.U.R.P, University of Colorado, 1990; J.D.
Shepard Broad College of Law, Nova Southeastern University, 2004. Member, Florida Bar, 2004.
Member, Copyright and Fair Use Committee, Association for Recorded Sound Collections (ARSC)
and “Fair Use and Copyright” columnist in the association's biennial publication ARSC JOURNAL.
Previously published in the JOHN MARSHALL LAW REVIEW (2005), FLORIDA BAR JOURNAL (2006),
and TRANSPORTATION LAW JOURNAL (2010). Author of MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE MUSIC: A
HISTORY OF JAZZ DISCOGRAPHY (University of Chicago, 2013).
1 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
2 Sound Recordings, limited copyright, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
3 37 Fed. Reg. 3055 (Feb. 11, 1972) (proposed amendments to 37 C.F.R. §§ 202.8 and 202.15a
regarding permissible registration of musical compositions and sound recordings).
4 Sound Recordings, limited copyright, Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 § 3 (1971) (“The provisions
of title 17, United State Code, as amended by section 1 of this Act, shall apply only to sound
recordings fixed, published, and copyrighted on and after the effective date of this Act and before
January 1, 1975 and nothing in title 17, United States Code, as amended by section one of this Act,
shall be applied retroactively or be construed as affecting in any way any rights with respect to
sound recordings fixed before the effective date of this Act.”).
5 The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2544 (1976).
6 17 U.S.C. § 303 (after 1997, 17 U.S.C. § 303(a), see Pub. L. 105-80, § 11, 111 Stat. 1534 (1997));
17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2000).
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to be published without being simultaneously divested into the public domain. 7 The
Register of Copyright had not prepared a copyright notice protocol because sound
recordings were not capable of being copyrighted at that time. 8 Congress quickly
added new language to Section 303 making clear its intent that pre-1972 sound
recordings were neither federally copyrightable nor legally capable of publication,
further muddying their legal status. 9
The extent to which the status, or to be more accurate, the lack of status, of
pre-1972 phonorecords10 has created a legal and environmental void is best
demonstrated by a series of cases litigated in New York from 2003 to 2006, known
colloquially as the Capitol v. Naxos cases. They involved a series of classical music
recordings made in London in the 1930s by the Gramophone Company, Ltd. They
were reissued worldwide by Naxos starting in 1999. The last United Kingdom
copyright on these recordings expired in 1986. Despite this, Capitol Records, who
asserted worldwide rights as a licensee to EMI, successor to the Gramophone
Company, sued Naxos for copyright infringement.11
The District Court for the Southern District of New York initially determined
that no issue of federal copyright was involved and that no tort had been committed
under New York state law, based primarily on the expiration of the United Kingdom
copyrights, and granted summary judgment in favor of Naxos. 12 Capitol appealed to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which found that Capitol held a state-based,
common law copyright in the recordings, and certified the case to the New York
Court of Appeals to answer three questions pertaining to New York state law. The
central question was “[d]oes the expiration of the term of copyright in [England]
terminate a common-law copyright in New York?”13

7 37 Fed. Reg. 3055 (Feb. 11, 1972) (Amendments to 37 C.F.R. § 202.2 “Copyright Notice
Requirements”).
8 La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top, 53 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1995); Mayhew v. Gusto Records, Inc.,
960 F. Supp. 1302 (M.D. Tenn. 1997).
9 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2000); Pub. L. No. 105-80, 111 Stat. 1529, § 11 (1997); Hearings on H. R.
1861, Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1994, 90th Cong, 1st Sess. (Nov. 9, 1995) (comments of Marybeth
Peters, Register of Copyrights); 143 Fed. Reg. S11301 (Oct. 28, 1997) (comments of Senator Hatch).
10 “Phonorecords” are physical objects in which sounds are fixed.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2010)
(Historical and Revision Notes). Phonorecords include cylinders, 78s, LPs, open-reel tapes, cassette
tapes, 8-track tapes, CDs, DVDs or any other tangible medium. They do not include digital
downloads, streaming, or any other intangible medium. Mark A. Bailey, Phonorecords and
Forfeiture of Common-Law Copyright in Music, 71 Wash. L. R. 151, 152-53, n. 13 (1996). “Sound
recordings” are original works of authorship comprising an aggregate of musical, spoken words or
other sounds that have been fixed in tangible form. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2010) (Historical and Revision
Notes). On its own initiative, the Copyright Office has created the term “song,” a unitary musical
work analogous to a unitary “musical work” in § 102(a)(2) of the Copyright Act after 1976 to
distinguish between the rights in copyright accorded to unitary musical works and sound recordings
in § 106(4)-(6) of the Copyright Act. See Copyright Office Circular 56 (Copyright Registration for
Sound Recordings (2014)) and Circular 56a (Copyright Registration of Musical Compositions and
Sound Recordings (2012)), available at http://copyright.gov/circs/.
11 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America, Inc. (Capitol v. Naxos I), 262 F. Supp. 2d 204
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
12 Id.
13 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America, Inc. (Capitol v. Naxos III), 372 F. 3d 471, 484
(2d Cir. 2004).
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Judge Victoria Graffeo returned a complex opinion that clearly replied to the
Circuit Court’s query in the negative.14 She also expanded the scope of the Circuit
Court’s inquiry by examining at length the threshold question of whether the tort of
common-law copyright infringement existed in New York state. 15 Although Klaus
Heymann, president and CEO of Naxos International, 16 the Hong Kong based firm
that owned Naxos of America, subsequently entered into a consent decree with
Capitol agreeing to withdraw most of Naxos’s historical reissue series in the United
States,17 it is unclear if Judge Graffeo’s opinion actually reached the conclusion that
Naxos met all the elements necessary to comprise an action for copyright
infringement in New York.18
Many lawyers who have read the Capitol v. Naxos IV case have accused Judge
Graffeo of bad faith because she relied on precedent that veered back-and-forth
between cases that dealt with musical compositions, which have been copyrightable
since 1831, and sound recordings—the aural material contained on a single record or
tape—which have only been copyright-eligible since February 15, 1972. They
correctly point out that the chain of legal precedent is entirely different in each type
of case. They maintain that the two cannot be woven together to form a single united
argument. I will go into the background of many of these cases, which extend from
Fred Waring and His Orchestra to Z.Z. Top, to show that there is a consistency—but
only if Judge Graffeo was making an argument for something very different from
that of the plain language of her decision.
II.
Printing was introduced to England about 1471 by William Caxton. 19 In 1557,
the Stationer’s Company received a royal charter from Queen Mary. The Company
essentially acted as a guild, performing two functions. First, it policed its members
on behalf of the crown, blocking seditious or blasphemous material. Second, it
upheld the interests of its members by limiting book publishing to its membership
and rationalizing their output by preventing the inadvertent duplication of texts. 20 It
did this through a process called registration. After receiving a license (usually from
a chaplain to the Archbishop of Canterbury), a member-printer submitted one copy of
the book’s manuscript to be registered with the Company. In the event two similar
works appeared on the market, the one with the earlier registration was presumed to
be the true edition until proven otherwise. The procedure was intended to protect
14 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America, Inc. (Capitol v. Naxos IV), 830 N.E. 2d. 250
(N.Y. 2005).
15 “[W]e conclude that New York provides common-law copyright protection to sound recordings
not covered by the federal Copyright Act.” Id. at 265.
16 “Naxos International” is a service mark; the actual name of the international holding
company is hnh, Ltd. See SOAMES, infra note 17.
17 NICHOLAS SOAMES, THE STORY OF NAXOS: THE EXTRAORDINARY STORY OF THE INDEPENDENT
RECORD LABEL THAT CHANGED CLASSICAL RECORDING FOREVER, 117-119 (Piatkus Press, 2012).
18 Id. at 266. This will be discussed in detail later.
19 WARREN CHAPPEL, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE PRINTED WORD 73-74 (Nonpareil Books, 1970).
20 ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG TO GATES,
23-29 (University of Chicago Press, 2009).
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printers, not authors who had few, if any rights. This system was formalized by
Parliament in the Press Act of 1662.21
But the Press Act fell victim to the turmoil of the English civil war and
subsequent restoration. William and Mary allowed it to lapse in 1695. It was
replaced with the Statute of Anne of 1709, 22 which established a government-granted
copyright of 14 years to the publisher, with a reversion to the author for another
fourteen years. Previously published works received a single 21-year term.23 Unlike
the registration system at the Stationer’s Company, government copyright extended
only to published works. To receive protection, the applicant had to submit a printed
copy of the work along with the copyright application. Almost immediately, two
questions arose. “What was the status of a book before it was published?” “What
was its status after the government copyright lapsed?”
In a 1769 case, Millar v. Taylor, the Court of King’s Bench unanimously
determined that a book or other literary work belongs to the author through the
common law, and thus for another to plagiarize it before publication was a wrongful
act for which the author could seek redress. Three of the four judges held that the
author continued to hold a literary property in his work even after the end of the
term specified in the Statute of Anne, but each judge rested this part of his decision
on such diverse grounds that it was hard to tell what law had been established. 24
The situation wasn’t rectified until February 4, 1774, when twelve members of
the House of Lords, sitting as an advisory chamber to the full House of Lords, itself
acting as a final court of appeals, heard Donaldson v. Beckett.25 Lord Chancellor
Apsley posed the issues of law in the form of three questions. The first asked if an
author had a sole and enforceable first right to publish and print his work under the
common-law. Yes, 8–3.26 The second asked if, assuming there was no statutory
copyright, would publication by itself divest the author of this common-law
copyright? No, 7–4. The third question was the decider: do the copyright protections
provided under the Statute of Anne cut off these common-law copyrights, limiting the
author’s remedies to those contained in the statute? Yes, 6–5.27
In essence, the Lords determined that statutory copyright was not something
added atop common-law copyright, like frosting on a cupcake; instead, it cut off and
replaced common-law copyright. When statutory copyright ended, either because of
the expiration of term or because the applicant failed to follow proper registration or
Id. at 25.
8 Anne. Ch. 19.
23 Capitol Records v. Naxos IV, 830 N.E. 2d. at 254.
24 Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303 [KB 1769]. “[F]our judges, in giving their opinions, seriatum,
exhausted the argument on both sides. Two of the judges, and Lord Mansfield, held that, by the
common law, an author had a literary property in his works; and they sustained their opinion with
very great ability.” Wheaton and Donaldson v. Peters and Grigg, 33 U.S. 591, 654 (1834) (Justice
M’Lean).
25 Donaldson v. Beckett, 4 Burr. 2408 (1774).
26 Some accounts say 10-1. Wheaton and Donaldson, 33 U.S.at 678 (Justice Thompson,
dissenting).
27 JOHNS, supra note 20, at 136-37. The clerk recorded the vote as 6–5 against, but from the
context of the vote and subsequent dispensation to the full House of Lords, it is apparent that the
vote was 6–5 in favor. Lord Mansfield abstained (and remained silent) on all three votes because he
was the presiding judge at the lower court. Had Mansfield voted, Johns believes the vote on the
third question would have been 7–5. Id. at 137.
21
22

[15:1 2015]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

6

renewal procedures, the literary work fell into the public domain, and in the words of
one of the Miller v. Taylor judges, “is virtually and necessarily a gift to the public.” 28
Overlooked (because under the circumstances, it was superfluous) was the second
question: where no statutory copyright existed, the act of publication was
insufficient, in itself, to revoke common-law copyright and throw a work into the
public domain.
After the failure of the Articles of Confederation, the United States commenced
operations under its new Constitution in April, 1789. Article 1, §8, cl. 8 of the
Constitution authorized congress “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries.” This did not specify a “copyright,” merely
a “right,” but it is clear that the drafters were thinking in terms of an English-style
copyright. In Federalist No. 43, James Madison, in explaining the clause, stated that
[t]he utility of it will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors
has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of
common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason
to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both
cases with the claims of individuals.
In Federalist No. 43, Madison also gave the paragraph its name: The Progress
Clause.29
One of the first acts of the new Congress in 1790 was to enact a copyright law. 30
Printed works were eligible for a British-style, 14/14-year term. However, in keeping
with the requirements of the Progress Clause, the rights in both the initial and
renewal terms vested in the author, not the publisher. An applicant had to register
the title of the work, issue a newspaper notice within two months of publication, and
deposit a copy of the printed work within six months. An American rerun of
Donaldson v. Beckett ensued in 1834 in Wheaton v. Peters.31 A publisher forgot to
fulfill some of the formalities of the copyright act32 and had some of his books pirated.
Acknowledging that he had forgotten to fulfill all the requirements, the publisher
pled that he should nevertheless be entitled to some kind of common-law copyright.
With no homegrown law yet to follow, a majority of the Supreme Court used
Donaldson, interpreting it to mean that once a government copyright scheme has
been put in place, it is the only copyright law that remains, and the common-law
copyright is cut off.33

28 Wheaton and Donaldson v. Peters and Grigg, 33 U.S. 591, 676 (Justice Thompson, dissenting)
(quoting Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr 2303 [KB 1769] (J. Yeates, dissenting)).
29 The Federalist, A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States, 278-279 (Modern
Library, 1937).
30 Act for the Encouragement of Learning, May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124.
31 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
32 These formalities were added by amendments legislated in 1802. Id. at 663.
33 “That Congress, in passing the Act of 1790, did not legislate in reference to existing rights,
appears clear from the provision that the author, etc., ‘shall have the sole right and liberty of
printing,’ etc. Now if this exclusive right existed at common law, and Congress were about to adopt
legislative provisions for its protection, would they have used this language? Could they have
deemed it necessary to vest a right already vested?” Id. at 661.
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But Justice Thompson, in a dissent, argued that in their vote in Donaldson v.
Beckett, the House of Lords had meant only that a specific statute, the 1709 Statute
of Anne, cut off a specific common law, i.e. that in effect in England in 1709. The
Statute of Anne never applied to either the colonial predecessor of Pennsylvania,
which was governed by colonial rules, or the current Commonwealth, governed by
state law, followed by the Constitution of 1787–89. Therefore, while there may not
be perpetuity of common-law copyright under United States federal law after
publication, this need not apply to Pennsylvania. 34
The “cupcake” idea was back, only in a new, federalized form. Justice Thompson
outlined an alternative vision of copyright, one in which state-law powers formed the
bedrock of an all-embracing, perpetual copyright regime, with federal statutory
copyright a thin frosting slathered on top. After a few years, the federal copyright
may melt away, but the state-law copyright always remains. Thompson’s argument
didn’t carry the day in 1834, but a hundred and seventy years later it became one of
the cornerstones of Judge Graffeo’s opinion in Capitol Records v. Naxos IV.
Starting with the Copyright Act of 1831, one could copyright a musical
composition—but only as sheet music.35 This created a gap between patent and
copyright law. Patent law protected a new and unique mechanical device such as a
gramophone, but didn’t address the songs it played. Copyright law, on the other
hand, may have protected the composer’s rights to the written scores of the songs the
gramophone played, but it didn’t cover its mechanical parts. Some argued that the
cylinder the gramophone played was a mechanical part; others, that it was a copy of
the sheet music; still others that it was a performance of the composition, just like a
stage play was a performance of the written script. 36
The 1831 Act required that sheet music, like books and play scripts, be
published as a precondition to copyright.37 This requirement was called investiture.
Until published, any work was the exclusive property of its author under the common
law. “In that state,” a judge explained in 1872 in Palmer v. DeWitt, “the manuscript
is, in every sense, his peculiar property, and no man can take it from him without
34 See Id. at 690, 697, 698 (“Whatever effect and operation the statute of Anne may have been
deemed to have had upon the common law in England, that statute never having been in force in
Pennsylvania, the common law right remains unaffected by it. . . . The language of the statute of
Anne, which is considered as vesting the right, is the same as in the act of Congress. . . . And there is
no more reason for contending that the remedy given by the statute [i.e. by statutory law]
supersedes the common law remedy under the act of Congress than under the Statute of Anne.”).
35 Act to Amend Several Acts Respecting Copyrights of February 3, 1831, Ch. 16, 4 Stat. II, 436.
36 “I cannot convince myself that these perforated strips of paper [piano rolls] are copies of sheet
music within the meaning of the copyright law. They are not meant to be addressed to the eye as
sheet music, but they form part of a machine. . . . They are a mechanical invention made for the sole
purpose of performing tunes mechanically upon a musical instrument.” White-Smith Music
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 28 Sup. Ct. 319, 321 (1908) (quoting Kennedy v.
McTammany, 33 Fed. 584 (1888) (J. Colt)).
37 “That no person shall be entitled to the benefit of this act, unless he shall, before publication,
deposit a printed copy of the title of such book, or books, map, chart, musical composition, print, cut,
or engraving in the clerk’s office of the district court . . . and the author or proprietor of [same] shall,
within three months from the publication of [same] deliver or cause to be delivered a copy of the
same to the clerk of said district.” Act to Amend Several Acts Respecting Copyrights of February 3,
1831, 4 Stat. II, Ch. 16, (21st Cong.) §4, at 437. Also, under § 5 of the 1831 Act, copyright notice had
to appear on every copy “of each and every edition published” as a precondition of statutory federal
copyright.
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being guilty of a violation of his property.” 38 This was based on old English law. One
could not, by definition, commit sedition, blasphemy or libel unless the offensive
writing was published, so the power to refuse publication—to keep one’s written
thoughts private—was a powerful civil right of self-protection. But “once published it
is dedicated to the public, and the author has not, at common law, any exclusive right
to multiply copies of it or to control the subsequent issues of copies by others. The
right . . . is the creature of a statute.”39
If a composer invested his or her score and followed all the necessary
copyrighting formalities, it became federally protected with the specifics spelled out
in the Copyright Act. But if the score was published without securing federal
copyright, it was released into the public domain. This was known as divestiture.40
Stage plays presented an early problem. In developing a new play, playwrights
frequently started from rough notes, then drilled the actors on their lines.
Depending on what met with audience approval, they re-wrote the play before
settling on a final version, which was then printed and sold like sheet music between
acts. Rival impresarios paid teams of actors to sit in the audience and memorize a
single scene, then immediately leave and transcribe what they heard. The rival
assembled their efforts, edited it, and either produced his own play or printed a
pirated version. When sued, the rival claimed that the original production published
the play, resulting in divestiture. The courts were of two minds. Some said
performance amounted to a “limited publication,” and while rivals could use copies to
stage their own performances, they could not sell printed editions. Other courts said
performance was flatly not publication, and copying for either stage or sale was an
infringement.
The idea of “limited publication” was first advocated by Massachusetts courts.
Laura Keen was producing a play called Our American Cousin, which she purchased
from Tom Taylor of London.41 Moses Kimball poached it and staged his own version
at a place called the Boston Museum. Keen sought an injunction to shut down
Kimball’s production. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held in 1860 in Keene v.
Kimball that it was legal for Kimball to use a team of actors to memorize parts of
Keen’s production, then transcribe, compile and stage his own version. 42 The court
declined to comment on whether Keen could or could not prohibit transcription
within her premises.43 In an incredibly prescient bit of dicta, the court also noted “we
do not intend in this decision to intimate that there is any right to report,
phonographically or otherwise, a lecture or other written discourse.” 44
In 1872, the New York Superior Court faced a somewhat different situation. In
this case, the second-comer wasn’t interested in staging a rival performance, but in
Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532, 537 (1872).
Id. at 536.
40 Jewelers’ Merchandise Agency v. Jewelers’ Publishing Co., 155 N.Y. 241, 247 (N.Y. 1898).
41 A comedy, most famous as the play Abraham Lincoln was watching at Ford’s Theatre the
night he was assassinated.
42 Keene v. Kimball, 82 Mass. 545 (1860).
43 See Id. at 551 (“The counsel for the plaintiff, in their argument, have laid much stress upon
the allegation that the defendant has availed himself of a surreptitious copy in the bill, and no such
fact is admitted by the demurrer.”) The implication was that this matter should be decided by the
legislature.
44 Id. at 551-52.
38
39
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publishing a printed copy of the play. It determined that “the right publicly to
represent a dramatic composition for profit, and the right to print and publish the
same composition to the exclusion of others, are entirely distinct.” 45 Here, the
presentation of a stage play was not publication, or to be precise, was a publication so
limited in scope as to not result in the divestiture of the author’s pre-publication,
common-law copyrights.46 After Keene, the cases slowly evolved away from this
“limited publication” theory. In 1882 Massachusetts reversed itself, overturning
Keene v. Kimball and holding that a stage performance was neither a limited nor a
general publication.47 Finally, in a 1912 case, Ferris v. Frohman, the Supreme Court
finally put the matter to rest by deciding that the presentation of a stage play did not
amount to publication, general or limited. 48
But as the Keene v. Kimball court may have foreseen, technology changed
everything. In 1888, the copyright holders to a musical composition, previously
registered as sheet music, sued in federal court in Massachusetts to stop the makers
of perforated paper rolls for a player piano-like device called an organette from
copying their song.
Judge Colt in Kennedy v. McTammany ruled that no
infringement occurred, because the rolls were not copies of the sheet music, as “they
are not made to be addressed to the eye as sheet music, but [rather] they form part of
a machine.”49
In 1901 George Rosey was similarly sued by the Joseph W. Stern Music Co.
when he churned out 5,000 phonograph cylinders of two of their most popular tin pan
alley songs, “Take Back Your Gold” and “Whisper Your Mother’s Name.” The court
said Rosey had not violated Stern’s copyrights because his wax cylinders were, like
the metal cylinder of a music box, merely part of a machine. “We cannot regard the
reproduction, through the agency of the phonograph, of the sounds of musical
instruments playing the music composed and published by [the Stern Music Co.] as
copying or publication,” it concluded.50
Starting in 1901, the Register of Copyrights had pleaded with Congress to
update the Copyright Act, and in 1905 the President added his voice, stating that:
Our copyright laws urgently need revision. They are imperfect in definition,
confused and inconsistent in expression; they omit provision for many
articles which, under modern reproductive processes, are entitled to
protection; they impose hardships upon the copyright proprietor which are
not essential to the fair protection of the public; they are difficult for the
courts to interpret; and impossible for the Copyright Office to administer
with satisfaction to the public.51

Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532, 542 (N. Y. 1872).
Id. at 543.
47 Tompkins v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32 (1882).
48 Ferris v. Frohman 223 U. S. 424, 435-436 (1912) (quoting 2 Story’s Eq. Jur. § 950).
49 Kennedy, 33 F. at 584 (1888).
50 Stern v. Rosy, 17 App. D.C. 562, 564-565 (1901).
51 “The History of U.S.A. Copyright Law Revision from 1901 to 1954” (Report No. 1) Copyright
Law Revision: Studies Prepared Pursuant to S. Res. 53, 86th Cong., 1-2 (1960) (quoting a letter from
Theodore Roosevelt to Congress, December 1905).
45
46
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Work started in early 1906 and promptly bogged down for the better part of
three years. One of the main sticking points was mechanically reproduced music. In
spite of the Kennedy v. McTammany and Stern Music v. Rosey decisions, the Register
of Copyright had been accepting piano rolls for registration, and by 1906 the Aeolian
Co. had registered over 2,000 of them. 52
As the copyright revisions ground through 1908 and into 1909, composers, music
publishers and record makers started working at cross-purposes in a confusing maze
of interests. Some composers and music publishers didn’t want records and cylinders
considered “copies,” because they wanted the same type of performance royalties
from record companies that playwrights got from stage productions.
Other
composers and publishers did want piano rolls and cylinders considered copies so
they could fully control them like sheet music. Some record companies argued that
phonorecords and piano rolls weren’t even “writings,” and thus fell completely
outside the scope of the Progress Clause of the Constitution. Others thought this was
chasing after a fool’s pot of gold, and that their fellow record executives were taking
more of a risk of having their own products pirated than they stood to gain from
dodging payments to composers and publishers. 53 Frankly, everyone began biding
their time until the Supreme Court decided a case called White-Smith Music
Publishing v. Apollo Co., due out in early 1908.
Player pianos were big business. One Chopin score, for instance, is known to the
world only because the composer himself was paid to perform it on the keyboard for a
piano roll, and a copy survived, although all the sheet music has been lost. 54 The
makers of piano rolls transcribed new songs in one of two ways. First, an arranger,
score in hand, transferred the melody onto a paper roll by pencil using a metal grid
guide. Marking across the width of the paper indicated which piano key to strike,
and extending the mark lengthwise held the key down longer. When the arranger
finished, a craftsman with special punches put holes wherever the roll was marked.
This master was then used to prepare metal rolls used to punch out the consumer
copies. The second way was the method Chopin used: playing a modified player
piano. However, instead of playing the piano, the clockwork worked in reverse: it fed
the paper roll as the pianist played and marked the keystrokes in pencil or ink.
From there, the marked roll would go to the punching craftsman the same as a
master prepared by an arranger using a marking grid.55
The Apollo Company made life easier by simply copying the rolls produced by
White-Smith Music. The Court based its reasoning on the 1888 Kennedy v.
McTammany case and an 1899 English case, Boosey v. Whight, also dealing with
piano rolls.56 In Kennedy, the attorney for the allegedly infringed maker had argued
unsuccessfully that the rolls were just a different type of musical notation. The
English court, on the other hand, held that piano rolls were not copies because its
statutes defined copyright as “the sole and exclusive liberty of printing and otherwise
52 Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Committee on Patents to Amend and
Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, March 26-28, 1908, 60th Cong. 343-346 (1908)
(Statement of George W. Pound, DeKlist Musical Instrument Mfg. Co.).
53 Barbara A. Ringer, “The Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Recordings” (Report No. 26)
Copyright Law Revision: Studies Prepared Pursuant to S. Res. 53, 86th Cong.4-6 (Feb. 1957).
54 SOAMES, supra note 17.
55 White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 28 Sup. Ct. 319, 320 (1908).
56 Boosey v. Whight, 1 Ch. 836 (1899); Kennedy, 33 F. at 584 (1888).
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multiplying copies.”57 But note the logical fallacy here. Basing White-Smith Music
on Boosey v. Whight amounted to arguing that “we have an American copyright code
that doesn’t define whether piano rolls are copyrightable or not. Thus, we will look
for interpretation to an English case decided on the grounds that British statutory
law explicitly excludes piano rolls from copyright.”
Boosey v. Wright had defined a “copy” as “that which comes so near to the
original as to give every person seeing it the idea created by the original.” 58 Justice
Day, in his majority opinion, tweaked this to create his own definition: “a copy of a
musical composition [is a] ‘written or printed record of it in intelligible notation.’”
Therefore, while “it may be true that in a broad sense a mechanical instrument
which reproduces a tune copies it,” the court concluded that “this is a strained and
artificial meaning [as] these musical tones are not a copy which appeals to the eye.”59
Justice Holmes delivered a special concurrence. He first began with an
extraordinary piece of dicta. Property starts with tangible objects. It protects
possession and confers a right of exclusion. But copyright is different, more abstract.
The right to exclude is not directed at an object, but is projected outward, to the
whole world:
It restrains the spontaneity of men where, but for it, there would be
nothing of any kind to hinder their doing as they saw fit. It is a
prohibition of conduct remote from the persons or tangibles of the
party having the right. It may be infringed a thousand miles from the
owner and without his ever becoming aware of the wrong. It is a
right which could not be recognized or endured for more than a
limited time and therefore, I may remark, in passing, it is one which
hardly can be conceived except as a product of statute. 60
The basic premise is that copyright is a creature of statute. It therefore has no
“natural” or “historical” dimension. There is thus nothing to impede its expansion or
alteration in parallel with technological change. Technology at the turn of century
had given rise to a new “extraordinary” right, a “rational collocation of sounds,” and
that “on principle anything that mechanically reproduces that collation of sound
ought to be held a copy,” although Holmes admitted that because all such rights were
statutory, they almost certainly did not exist within the language of the copyright
code as it then existed.61 Holmes’s “extraordinary right” to protect the “rational
collocation of sounds” was not the same right as an author or music composer
received under copyright. “The restriction is confined to the specific form, to the
collocation devised.” In other words, Holmes was describing a specific expression
protection, or, as it has since become known, the “sound recording” aspect. 62

Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562 (1901), citing Boosey v. Whight, 1 Ch. 836 (1899).
White-Smith Music Publishing Co., 28 Sup. Ct. at 323. To be precise, in his opinion, Justice
Day was citing Boosey v. Whight, which in turn was quoting Judge Bailey in West v. Francis, Barn &
Ald. 743.
59 White-Smith Music Publishing Co., 28 Sup. Ct. at 323.
60 Id. at 324 (J. Holmes, concurring).
61 Id.
62 Id.
57
58
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It was the inability of the other justices (and, for that matter, most congressmen
and industry executives) to grasp that a phonorecord was comprised of two separate
elements that muddled the Court’s decision in White-Smith Music and the
deliberations of the Congressional copyright committees. First, there is the musical
composition, an idealized musical concept, which can usually be published on paper.
Second, there is the sound recording, a “rational collocation of sounds,” the specific
aural expression of a performance or a sequence of captured sound. This can be the
playing of a composition, an improvised musical performance, or even non-music.
Based on the language in Justice Holmes’s concurrence, what allowed him to make
this conceptual leap was his rejection of the idea of a timeless, platonic, common-law
copyright; re-envisioning it as a flexible, purpose-specific statutory solution to an
equally specific set of property-rights allocation problems wrought by expanding
technology in an increasingly technological age.63
On the other hand, in holding that a “copy” of a composition must be a “written
or printed record” of the original identifiable to the eye, the majority in White-Smith
Music came very close to, if not outright stating, that a record could never meet the
eligibility criteria of the Progress Clause. 64 In its very first hearing in the long
march to the 1909 copyright act revisions, Horace Pettit of the Victor Talking
Machine Co., testified that an 1883 Supreme Court decision, Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,65 had held that a photograph was a “writing,” and thus
within the span of the Progress Clause, because “writings” were “all the forms of
writing, printing, engraving, etching &c., by which the ideas in the mind of the
author are given visible expression.” Significantly, Justice Miller, delivering the
majority opinion in Sarony, added that “[t]he only reason why photographs were not
included in the extended list [of things eligible for copyright] in the act of 1802 is
probably that they did not exist.”66
Analogously, Pettit told the Joint Committee on Patents that just because
phonorecords were not among the items specifically listed under the then-current
copyright code did not automatically mean they were ineligible for protection under
the Progress Clause should Congress choose to add them to the list in the future. 67
“The talking machine is a writing upon a record tablet,” Pettit testified, “not to be
63 The heart of the matter was accurately stated by Judge Leibell in RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman
et.al., 28 F. Supp. 787, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1939):
Prior to the advent of the phonograph, a musical selection once rendered by an
artist was lost forever, as far as that particular rendition was concerned. It could
not be captured and played back again by any mechanical contrivance then
known. Thus the property right of the artist, pertaining as it did to an intangible
musical interpretation, was in no danger of being violated. During all this time
the right was always present, yet because of the impossibility of violating it, it
was necessary to assert it.
64 For a summary of the history of this argument see: Barbara A. Ringer, “The Unauthorized
Duplication of Sound Recordings” (Report No. 26) Copyright Law Revision: Studies Prepared
Pursuant to S. Res. 53, 86th Cong. (Feb. 1957), at 12-13, 47-48; Hearings on S. 597: Copyright Law
Revision, April 28, 1968, “Letter of Barbara A. Ringer, Register of Copyrights, September 12, 1967”:
1175-1178.
65 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
66 Id.
67 Arguments Before the Committees on Patents on the Bills S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 To Amend
and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, June 6, 7 and 8, 1906, 59th Cong. 26-30 (1906)
(statement of Horace Pettit, Victor Talking Machine Co.).
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read visually, but audibly to be read through the medium of a vibrating pencil
engaging in the record groove.”68
Less than two years later, after White-Smith Music, Pettit again appeared before
the joint committee. While his personal opinion was basically unchanged,
[t]he decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
White-Smith v. The Apollo Company, recently decided, to my mind
strongly indicates that the court does not consider the subjection of
musical instruments to a copyright act to be constitutional . . . I want
to say that I am doubtful as to the constitutionality of a clause in a
copyright bill subjecting talking machines to the copyright act. 69
Albert Walker, the Victor Company’s lawyer, subsequently told the copyright
committee that
the Supreme Court says these perforated rolls are not copies. If not,
they are not writings. . . . The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to
give protection to anything except a writing. So that when the
Supreme Court decided as a matter of fact that these perforated rolls
cannot be read, it decided that they were not writings. 70
In the end, the committee on patents noted that “the reproduction of music by
mechanical means has been the subject of more discussion and has taken more of the
time of the committee than any other provision of the bill.” 71 The final compromise
version was not appended until the last markup of the bill, introduced on
February 15, 1909, only two weeks before the final vote of both houses of Congress on
March 3.72 Phonorecordings were not considered “copies” of a composition, and
couldn’t be copyrighted. However, provided the composition was registered and the
composer had allowed at least one person to record it, then all others could too, if
they paid a mandatory license fee of two cents a copy. This was somewhat analogous
to the licensing system used for stage plays. 73
Congress made one other change, and in doing so, created a century-long
conundrum, and not just for phonorecords. They changed Section 4, which defined
the universe of things protected under the act. The prior act had read “[t]hat the
works for which copyright may be secured under this Act shall be all the works of an
author”; it was changed to “[t]hat the works for which copyright may be secured
under this Act shall be all the writings of an author.”74 “Writings,” of course, is the
language used in the Constitution, so it defines the maximum power that Congress
Id. at 27.
Hearings Before the Committee on Patents on Pending Bills to Amend and Consolidate the
Acts Respecting Copyright, March 26, 27 and 28, 1908, 60th Cong. 274 (1908) (statement of Horace
Pettit, Victor Talking Machine Co.).
70 Hearings Before the Committee on Patents on Pending Bills to Amend and Consolidate the
Acts Respecting Copyright, March 26, 27 and 28, 1908, 60th Cong. 278-278 (1908) (statement of
Albert H. Walker, Victor Talking Machine Co.).
71 H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 4 (1909), as reprinted in E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman,
Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act (Fred Rothman & Co., 1976): VI, Pt. S, 4.
72 E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act (Fred
Rothman & Co., 1976): I, xx-xxii.
73 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, § 1(e).
74 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, § 4.
68
69
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can exercise. But in making the change, did Congress mean that all writings fell
under the umbrella of the act, but that some of them (i.e., records) did not receive
statutory protection? Or did it mean that some products of artistic creation
(i.e., records) had not been protected under the act because they did not qualify as
“writings” and thus Congress believed they were Constitutionally outside of its
jurisdiction pursuant to the Progress Clause?
III.
Almost nobody involved in the three-year-long struggle over the Copyright Act of
1909 was satisfied with the outcome, but most believed its most glaring errors and
omissions—the failure to adequately address mechanical sound reproduction, the
lack of coordination with the 1896 Berne Convention, and so on—would soon be
ironed out. Nobody would have believed you if you had told them that the process
would require another seven decades.75
Two of the continuing uncertainties were whether sound recordings were
“writings” for the purposes of the Progress Clause, and thus eligible for federal
copyright protection. If they weren’t writings, could they be protected by state-law
(either statutory or common-law) copyright? If they were writings, but Congress had
simply elected not to extend them protection, what degree of control did federal law
exercise over the boundaries of state-law copyright?
Second, did selling a record with a song, be it copyrighted or not, release either
its composition or sound recording into the public domain? After all, if phonorecords
weren’t copies of the compositions of the songs they contained, how could their sale
amount to a publication of their contents? Were they some special kind of
performance?
Within months of the 1909 Copyright Act, the issue arose in the courts in
Fonotipia Ltd. v. Bradley.76 Columbia and its associate, the Victor Company,
licensed matrices from a British label, Fonotipia, and printed and distributed them in
North America under Victor’s famous “Red Seal” series. The Continental Record Co.
dubbed them without permission and sold them under their own Continental label. 77
Fonotipia sued Continental in New York state court under state law to enjoin further
production.78 While Continental used labels that vaguely resembled the Red Seals,
Fonotipia did not assert that Continental was actually trying to sell them as genuine
Victors. The court faced a dilemma. This was not a patent, copyright or trademark
75 See generally The History of U.S.A. Copyright Law Revision from 1901 to 1954 (Report No. 1)
Copyright Law Revision: Studies Prepared Pursuant to S. Res. 53, 86th Cong.1-14 (1960); Barbara A.
Ringer, The Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Recordings (Report No. 26) Copyright Law Revision:
Studies Prepared Pursuant to S. Res. 53, 86th Cong., at 23-25 (Feb. 1957).
76 Fonotipia Ltd. et. al. v. Bradley, 171 F. 951 (E.D.N.Y. 1909).
77 To “dub” is to make a second-generation master disc from a shellac record produced from an
original first generation master.
78 It is not clear if Fonotipia sought relief on the grounds of unfair competition, or on an
otherwise undefined common-law copyright, which Judge Chatfield then identified sua sponte as
meeting the elements of unfair competition in New York. Also, it appears from the decision that
unfair competition was common-law in New York, as no statutory authority was cited. Fonotipia,
171 F. at 958, 963.
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case. Traditionally, unfair competition involved harm to the public from palming off
inferior goods packaged under a well-known brand name. But Continental sold the
records as their own, claiming they were just as good. Judge Chatfield outlined the
problem:
No case cited and decided strictly upon the question of unfair
competition, so far as called to the attention of the court, has ever
been granted relief in instances outside of imitation or deception . . . .
The basis of recovery [here] is the damage to the property rights of
the complainant, rather than the deception of the public. It is from
this contended: the better the imitation the greater reason there is for
issuing an injunction . . . it would seem that where a product is placed
upon the market, under advertisement and statement that the
substitute or imitating product is a duplicate of the original, and
where the commercial value of the imitation lies in the fact that it
takes advantage of and appropriates to itself the commercial
qualities, reputation, and salable properties of the original, equity
should grant relief.79
This, for the first time, was a clear, well-defined explanation of how the
long-standing, but ill-defined thing called “common-law copyright” could be updated
and rationalized for an industrialized world where “ideas” and “writings” no longer
shared much commonality any more.
However insightful his solution, it was still not Judge Chatfield’s preferred
solution:
It would seem therefore that the questions raised in the present case
may be avoided as to future compositions by copyrighting the original
rendition of the song . . . [but] serious discussion may arise over the
right obtained, for instance, by a grand opera singer who files a
copyright for resinging of a song already recorded by him or her, and
sold to the public upon a disc record.80 (emphasis added)
Note how Judge Chatfield, unlike Justice Holmes, hadn’t yet grasped the
distinction between composition and sound recording. He apparently believed that
the sound recording was a component of the composition, so if a record was deposited
with the copyright office, the composition and all possible performances by that
singer were copyrighted together.81 Any subsequent recording by that same singer
would infringe on his or her own copyright!
Presumably, if the composition was filed with the Register of Copyrights as
sheet music, any singer willing to pay a license fee for using it could make a
recording and file for copyright. But in Judge Chatfield’s view, it was the
combination of composition and performance that were protected to the exclusion of

Fonotipia, 171 F. at 961, 963, 964.
Id. at 963.
81 Id.
79
80
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all subsequent performances by the same singer.82 Judge Chatfield could not
conceive of a sound recording as a thing unto itself, something that didn’t need a
composition (or its copyright) behind it.
The earliest case to be tried wholly under the new 1909 Act was Aeolian Co. v.
Royal Music Roll Co.83 Aeolian had licensed a song from a music publisher to make
piano rolls. Royal then entered into a license with the same publisher for the same
song, also to make piano rolls, but instead of independently preparing their own
version, they simply copied Aeolian’s. Royal claimed that by securing a composition
license from the music publisher, it had done everything the law required. The court
held that Aeolian’s rolls were protected because a license to use a composition does
not, in itself, convey a right to its “production,” the means to manufacture or
reproduce it. Royal could not avail itself “of the skill and labor of the original
manufacturer of the perforated roll or record by copying or duplicating the same, but
must resort to the copyrighted composition or sheet music, and not pirate the work of
a competitor.”84
Aeolian v. Royal was sort of a legal half-way house. A specific sound recording
was protected, but only because the Copyright Act gave composers the control over
the use of their compositions. There was no questioning the role of the artist,
engineer, or other participant in the sound recording element. 85 Aeolian could sue
Royal only on behalf of the unnamed music publisher who owned the composition
that had been submitted to the copyright office in the form of sheet music. In fact,
Royal had maintained that the suit could not be continued because the publisher was
not an “aggrieved” party, that is, had not been harmed. In a threshold issue, the
court determined that Aeolian’s license agreement gave it standing to sue.86
More complex and far-reaching were the NAPA cases. The National Association
of Performing Artists (NAPA), which existed between 1935 and World War II, was
largely the brainchild of bandleader Fred Waring. The leader of a popular big band,
the Pennsylvanians, Waring was also a masterful businessman and entrepreneur. In
1936, he was approached by the inventor of an appliance for making health fruit
juices called a “blender.” It had been patented, but all the prototypes failed. Waring
bought it, made some technical changes, tested a couple dozen in the hotel lounges
his band played at, and contracted with a firm in Toledo to make the “Waring Mixer,”
which he marketed as the ultimate home bar accessory. It made him a fortune.87 He
was also getting paid $13,500 a week by Ford to play a two-hour-per-week radio
show—in the middle of the Great Depression.88

82 Judge Chatfield also apparently labored under the misapprehension that the 1909 Copyright
Act required composition rights-owners seeking the two-cent mechanical royalty for a phonorecord
to file a copy of that phonorecord. Id. at 963. It did not. Only a “notice of use” was required to be
filed, and of course the composition was required to be copyrighted as sheet music. Copyright Act of
1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, cf. § 1(e) and § 11.
83 Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 F. 926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912).
84 Id. at 927.
85 Specifically, § 36 of the Copyright Act of 1909.
86 Aeolian Co., 196 F. 926, 927.
87 VIRGINIA WARING, FRED WARING AND THE PENNSYLVANIANS 144-148 (University of Illinois
Press, 1997).
88 Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 194 A. 631, 633 (Penn., 1937).
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The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) collected
fees for stage (and later, radio) performances for a select group of composers starting
in 1914, and was joined by the more inclusive SESAC (Society of European Stage
Authors and Composers) in 1930 and BMI (Broadcast Music, Inc.) in 1932. The
Harry Fox Office was established by the Music Publishers’ Protective Association
soon after the 1909 Copyright Act to collect the two-cent mechanical fees owed to
composers for records.89 However, these were fees paid to composers, not to the
performers, who had no statutory rights in their sound recordings. It was the
purpose of NAPA to press for performers’ rights in recorded music.
In 1935, Waring had sent a copy of a recording of “Lullaby of Broadway” to the
Register of Copyright, seeking to apply for the rights to the “personal interpretation”
of the song. The copyright office rejected the application, writing Waring that
“[t]here is not and never has been any provision in the Act for the protection of an
artist’s personal interpretation or rendition of a musical work not expressible by
musical notation in the form of ‘legible’ copies.” 90 The next battle was to go after the
radio stations that Waring, Paul Whiteman, Guy Lombardo, and the other NAPA
members believed were forcing them, in Waring’s words, “to have our records playing
in competition to us.”91
Waring’s contract with Victor stated that the label of each of his records was to
carry the notation “not licensed for radio broadcast.” Radio station WDAS in
Philadelphia purchased a Waring record and broadcast it, paying the required
ASCAP fee.92 Waring sought an injunction under Pennsylvania state law to block
the further broadcast of his records, asserting that he had “property rights in their
[the band’s] artistic interpretation” that was independent of the composition, and
thus not covered by the ASCAP system. The Court asked, “Does the performer’s
interpretation of a musical composition constitute a product of such novel and artistic
creation as to invest him with a property right therein?”93
The answer was “yes.” A musical composition is, by itself, an incomplete work,
and that the performer “contributes by his interpretation something of novel
intellectual or artistic value,” thereby creating something to which he or she is
entitled to as a property right, although it does not emanate from the federal
copyright code.94 Waring had successfully climbed the first two steps. He had proved
(1) creative contribution constitutes a valid intellectual property; and (2) that his
ownership of the band, a Pennsylvania corporation, gave him legitimate title to that
property.95
But was this property right lost through publication? Recall the distinction
between “limited” and “general” publication. Prior to 1912, some courts had said that
producing an as-yet unpublished play constituted a “limited” publication, and that
rivals could stage competing productions, but could not produce printed versions. In
1912, the Supreme Court quashed this, stating that live performances did not
89 Stanley Sadie, “Copyright,” New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians IV, 751-754
(Macmillian, 1980).
90 Waring, 194 A. at 633 n. 2.
91 WARING, supra note 87, at 138.
92 Waring, 194 A. at 633 n. 2.
93 Id. at 634.
94 Id. at 635.
95 Id.
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constitute any form of publication. 96 But there is also another sense in which
“limited” publication occurs.
Because they were marked on the label “Not licensed for radio broadcast,” it was
clear that Waring’s intent was to restrict their distribution to a defined audience. 97
Thus, the publication was not sufficiently general to divest Waring of his rights in its
sound recording.98 Waring was granted his injunction, based on the same grounds of
unfair competition that had played an important role in the Fonotipia case in New
York.99
Two years later, Waring repeated his success, this time in a North Carolina
court. This case was even stronger, as it involved a transcription disc of one of
Waring’s Ford radio shows, marked “to be used only on the Ford Motor Program.” 100
Bolstered by these successes, NAPA decided to go for the big prize: New York state.
NAPA member Paul Whiteman was picked to go up against station WNEW in
RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman.101 The facts were virtually identical to the Waring
Pennsylvania case. The district court held for Whiteman, explaining that:
Prior to the advent of the phonograph, a musical selection once
rendered by an artist was lost forever, as far as that particular
rendition was concerned. It could not be captured and played back
again by any mechanical contrivance then known. Thus the property
right of the artist, pertaining as it did to an intangible musical
interpretation, was in no danger of being violated. During all this
time the right was always present, yet because of the impossibility of
violating it, it was not necessary to assert it.102 (emphasis added)
This is diametrically opposite the position Justice Holmes took in his
concurrence in White-Smith Music.103 According to Judge Leibell, it didn’t really
matter all that much if the sound recordings were in the federal Copyright Act; that
was just frosting on the cupcake. The bedrock of such rights had always existed in
the common law, with the states.104
The court also went on to agree with the Waring decisions that the restriction
label “for home use only” resulted in a limited distribution of the record, and that the
appropriate tort was unfair competition. 105 The radio station appealed, and the case
ended up in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in the courtroom of Judge Learned
Hand.

Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912).
Although the court stated that the (unnamed) composers had issued only restricted-use
licenses, left unexplained was why the compositions contained on the record were in the ASCAP
repertory, which are typically offered on blanket terms. Waring, 194 A. at 634.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 641-42, Fonotipia Ltd, 171 F. at 951.
100 Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp 338 (E.D.N.C. 1939). The radio station was WMFD, Charlotte.
101 RCA Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Whiteman et. al., 28 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
102 Id. at 791.
103 White-Smith Music v. Apollo, 209 U.S. 1, 18-20 (J. Holmes, concurring).
104 Whiteman, 28 F. Supp. at 791.
105 Id. at 794.
96
97
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Just days before the Whiteman appeal, Judge Hand had heard oral arguments in
a seemingly unrelated case, Fashion Originators Guild v. Federal Trade
Commission.106 The Guild was set up to protect dressmaker’s patterns, to stop what
they called “style piracy.” The Federal Trade Commission charged them with
antitrust collusion. At the FTC’s administrative hearing, the Commission, having
established that the dressmakers were acting in concert to keep non-members from
poaching their designs, refused to hear what amounted to an affirmative defense
proffered by the Guild that they were protecting a legitimate and defensible property
right.107 Once collusion was established, asserted the FTC, the case was over.
Judge Hand rejected this, and performed the second half of the FTC hearing
himself.108 He quickly determined that the Guild members did have an intellectual
property right in their dress designs. “The author of a design for a dress should be
deemed to be on the same footing as the author of a drawing picture; and the author
of a drawing or a picture has a common property in its reproduction.” 109 In doing
this, he determined that the “property” the Fashion Originators was protecting was a
“writing.” He easily could have reached the opposite conclusion: that dress designs
were not writings, so could not be analogized to other copyrightable material at all.
Dress designs were not covered by federal copyright, so they fell within state,
common-law protection. Most of the subsequent analysis revolved around whether
the dress designs were “published” and thus divested to the public. “We have been
unable to discover any case which squarely presented this situation,” lamented
Hand, “that is, in which intellectual property, not covered by the copyright act then
in existence, was challenged because of its ‘publication.’” 110
Hand went all the way back to the 1774 Donaldson v. Beckitt case. The House of
Lords, in the second of their three votes, had decided that, hypothetically, in the
absence of the Statute of Anne, the publication of a work would not cut off an
author’s common-law copyright. The implication was that common-law copyright
was either 1) perpetual until permanently cut off by statutory copyright, followed by
entry into the public domain at the end of term (the majority’s view); or 2) perpetual,
but temporarily replaced by statutory copyright until end of term, at which point
common-law copyright was revived (i.e., the “cupcake theory”).
Hand reviewed, then rejected, both alternatives, at least as they applied to
American law.111 In the absence of statutory protection, he held that publication
terminated common-law copyright.
He objected that any perpetual state
common-law copyright that did not mandate divestment upon publication defeated
the purposes of the “limited times” restriction of the Progress Clause. This, in turn,
implied that anything that was a “writing,” but that was not protected under federal
106 Fashion Originators Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 114 F.2d 80
(2d Cir. 1940), aff’d. Fashion Originators Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 312
U.S. 457, (1941).
107 Fashion Originators, 114 F.2d at 82.
108 Id. at 82-83.
109 Id. at 83. The analogy wasn’t perfect; “works of art” were copyrightable under § 5(g) of the
1909 Copyright Act. On the other hand, only “Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical
character” were included in § 5(i), so it is debatable whether all drawings could be protected under
the copyright code as it read in 1940.
110 Id. at 83.
111 Id.
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copyright, was still governed by the copyright code. In particular, the definition of
“publication” in the copyright code applied equally to those things protected by
federal copyright and those things not protected and left to state-law copyright.112
Why should dress designs be accorded perpetual protection, even after
publication, simply because they were not protected by the copyright code, while
books and magazines lost all protection after a few decades? Hand asked. “It would
certainly be a strangely perverse anomaly that turned the grant of statutory
copyright into a detriment to the ‘author,’” he complained; “yet it would be hard to
prove that the statutory remedies conferred made up for the limitation of the
monopoly. Omission of property from the act would be a bonanza to those who
possessed property of that kind.”113
However, the “statutory remedies conferred” that Hand believed were
insufficient to “make up” for an unlimited duration of protection under common-law
copyright included the author’s ability to take advantage of a writing for anything
beyond de minimus uses without suffering the penalty of divestment into the public
domain. Letting the owners of common-law copyright property have perpetual
protection may have been a “bonanza,” a windfall, but terminating their rights at
first publication, without the opportunity to achieve any of the benefits of statutory
protection amounted to a wipeout.
The Guild of Fashion Originators appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court
affirmed Judge Hand’s decision, but Justice Black made it clear they didn’t think
much of his opinion.114 The Court reverted back to the trial court’s original logic: the
Guild did not contest the FTC’s finding of collusion, so any legal analysis ended
there. The Commission was under no obligation to hear the Guild’s supposed
affirmative defense. Black declined to even comment on the issue of whether
“fashion piracy” was illegal or tortious. He waived it away with a quick dismissal:
“nor can the unlawful combination be justified upon the argument that systematic
copying of dress designs is itself tortious, or should be . . . whether or not given
conduct is tortious is a question of state law, under our decision in Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins.”115 (emphasis added)
Incredibly, this would prove to be one of the single most important sentences in
the history of American sound recording law. This is why Judge Graffeo’s opinion in
Capitol Records v. Naxos IV reads so strangely. For Graffeo, it never was a copyright
case; it was an Erie v. Tompkins case.
For the moment, let’s return to New York City in 1940. Judge Hand has heard
the arguments in the Paul Whiteman case four days after Fashion Originators, and
then issued his opinion in July, four months after handing down his decision in the
earlier matter. Recall that Whiteman and the NAPA had won in the district court
with a decision that strongly recognized a musician’s rights in his or her sound
recording, a right independent of the musical composition. 116

112 Id. at 84. “We conclude therefore that, regardless of whether the Guild’s designs could be
registered or not, ‘publication’ of them was a surrender of its “common-law property in them.”
113 Fashion Originators, 114 F.2d at 83.
114 Fashion Originators Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457
(1941).
115 Id. at 468.
116 Whiteman, et. al. 28 F. Supp. at 791.
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Hand overturned that decision.117 He accepted the lower court’s argument that
Whiteman held a common-law property right arising out of the “skill and art
necessary to obtain [a] good recording”, but only as a hypothetical. 118 Even if it did
exist, he announced, it ended with the sale of the record, because sale amounted to
publication.
The “not for commercial use” label that had been such an important feature of
the Waring cases was irrelevant, because it was merely an attempt to control the use
of a good after its point of sale, which was illegal. 119 Hand drew an analogy: assume
the issue was the composer’s rights to sheet music, with Whiteman distributing
copies to the public that had “cannot be used for public performance” printed at the
top. Could he reasonably expect to limit its use to home parlors? No. What, then,
made his performer’s rights so different from his composer’s rights? If the act of
publishing sheet music would have thrown open its use to the public, absent the
rights accorded him in the 1909 copyright code, why were Whiteman’s “common-law”
rights any different?120
But Hand’s ruling contained the same contradictions as in Fashion Originators.
First, using his own example, when Whiteman published his hypothetical sheet
music, he did it to gain the protection of the Copyright Act. By publishing a
phonograph record, he received nothing. Because it wasn’t eligible for copyright,
there was no exchange of investiture for statutory copyright. There was only one
path—straight to divestiture. Hand saw this, and, as was the case in Fashion
Originators, chose it as the lesser of two evils:
We see no reason why the same acts that unconditionally dedicate the
common-law copyright in works copyrightable under the Act, should
not do the same in the case of works not copyrightable. Otherwise it
would be possible, at least pro tanto, to have the advantage of
dissemination of the work at large, and to retain a perpetual, though
partial, monopoly in it.121
And in fact, he cited back to Fashion Originators:
the fact that they [Whiteman’s records] are not within the act should
make no difference. Indeed, it is argued that . . . there is a perpetual
common-law copyright in works not copyrightable under the act; we
have answered that argument in Fashion Originators Guild and need
not repeat what we said.122
Now the second contradiction: the Progress Clause says that only “writings” can
be protected under copyright. Who has the power to define a “writing”? Congress.
Once something is deemed a writing, who determines if it will be accorded any
RCA Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Whiteman, et. al., 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940).
Id. at 88.
119 Id. at 89.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
117
118
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copyright protection? Congress. If it’s not protected, whose laws prevail? State law.
And for the purposes of state-law copyright, who gets to decide if something is
“published”? According to Judge Hand, this was a function of federal law.
Hand admitted that his decision contradicted the law established in
Pennsylvania in the Waring case, but also dismissed it:
It is true that the law is otherwise in Pennsylvania . . . . However,
since that is the law of Pennsylvania and since the broadcasting will
reach receiving sets in that state, it will constitute a tort committed
there; and if an injunction could be confined to those sets alone, it
would be proper. . . . We must therefore choose between denying any
injunction whatever—since in our judgment the act is unlawful only
in Pennsylvania—or enjoining W.B.O Broadcasting throughout the
Union and in Canada in order to prevent a tort in Pennsylvania. 123
And this was the Erie v. Tompkins dilemma.
IV.
The facts in 1938’s Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins are almost absurdly simple.124
Tompkins was a citizen of Pennsylvania. The Erie Railroad was a corporate citizen
of New York.
Tompkins was hurt in a railroad accident that occurred in
Pennsylvania. State law in Pennsylvania favored railroads. State law in New York
favored victims. Tompkins sued in federal court in New York, which he was
permitted to do in diversity.125
The court, following then-standard practice, applied federal “general”
(i.e., non-statutory) law. In practice, this nationwide common law of negligence was
moderately pro-victim. A jury awarded Tompkins $30,000. The railroad appealed
and the Supreme Court reversed, determining that the federal court should have
applied the applicable state law, because there is no such thing as federal common
law.126 But which state law? All throughout the case, the Supreme Court justices
assumed that Pennsylvania law would be applied by the New York court if the
railroad prevailed because of a federal law called the “rules of decision statute,” in
place since 1789.127 On its face, the rules of decision statute says that a federal court,
in the absence of a federal question, must use applicable state law. It was the reason
the Supreme Court reached the decision it did. However, the rules of decision statute
said (and says) nothing about choice of law: “The laws of the several states except
where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or

RCA Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d at 89-90.
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
125 Diversity jurisdiction is defined in the current 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). Where the parties are
from different states, the applicable federal district court has jurisdiction. Generally, the default
venue is the defendant’s place of residence, but there are many exceptions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391
(2012).
126 Erie v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. at 70, 80.
127 Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34.
123
124
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provide shall be regarded as the rules of decision in trials at common law, in cases
where they apply.”128
The justices simply assumed the choice of law would be Pennsylvania, because
federal courts had long interpreted the rules of decision statute to incorporate an
inherent element of lex loci delicti, the rule that says the law of the state where the
alleged tortious act took place shall be used, not the law of the state in which the
federal court was located.129 How is this relevant to Judge Hand and his opinions in
Fashion Originators and RCA v. Whiteman? In Erie v. Tomkins, the Supreme Court
directed the lower court to apply state law. Both the law directing the application of
state law for lack of federal question (the rules of decision statute), and the law
directing which state’s law to use (Supreme Court precedent; Hawkins and Day v.
Barney’s Lessee), were federal law. State law, and the law of Pennsylvania, was used
because federal law directed it. Neither state’s law played a role.
In Fashion Originators and RCA v. Whiteman, Judge Hand held that the
definition of publication, and role it played in divesture, was identical regardless of
whether a work was protected under federal statutory copyright or state-law
copyright. If a thing was a writing; if the Constitution permitted it to be swept
within the Copyright Act—whether it actually was or not—then it was subject to the
same basic rules of decision as a federally copyrighted work. The definition of
“publication” would not be left to the states, even for state common-law copyrighted
material.130
Justice Black in Fashion Originators may have said “whether or not given
conduct is tortious is a question of state law, under our decision in Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins,” but if the federal law controls all the vital definitions, such as
“publication,” “divestiture,” or even “writing,” it largely obviates the substantive
issues.131
According to Fred Waring, the NAPA largely collapsed after the RCA v.
Whiteman case, but he believed it had as much to do with the exigencies of the war as
with its loss.132
Soon after the war, a California state court heard Blanc v. Lantz. It was unique
in two respects: 1) it was the first case to directly address state statutory copyright,
and 2) it was handled in a singularly inept manner. 133
Mel Blanc was the famous “Ha-ha-ha-ha-ha” voice of the cartoon character
Woody Woodpecker. Lantz Productions lifted Blanc’s laugh from one of Woody’s
cartoons (apparently for a TV commercial), and Blanc sued for infringement under
Sections 980 and 983 of the California State Code. Section 980 read:
128

(2012)).

Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, 28 U.S.C. § 725 (text amended 1948, now 28 U.S.C. § 1652

129 Hawkins and Day v. Barney’s Lessee, 30 U.S. 457, 464 (1831) (“We have an analogous case
in the thirty-fourth section of the Judiciary Act of the United States; and which has been uniformly
held to be no more than a declaration of what the law would have been without it; to wit, that the
lex loci must be the governing rule of private right, under whatever jurisdiction private right comes
to be examined.”).
130 Judge Hand’s arguments in both these cases would be summarized in his dissent in a third,
later case: Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 666-667 (2d Cir. 1955) (J.
Hand, dissent).
131 Fashion Originators, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
132 Waring, Fred Waring and the Pennsylvanians, 142.
133 Blanc v. Lantz, 83 USPQ 137 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1949).
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The author of any product of the mind, whether it is an invention, or
a composition in letters or art, or a design . . . has an exclusive
ownership therein, and the expression or representation thereof,
which continues so long as the product and the representations or
expressions thereof made by him remain in his possession. 134
Similarly, Section 983 stated that “[i]f the owner of a product of the mind
intentionally makes it public, a copy or reproduction may be made public by any
person, without responsibility to the owner.”135 Admittedly, the specific language of
the statutes made for hard interpretation. How can one have the exclusive right “of
expression or representation,” but only so long as the work remains in one’s
possession and isn’t made public? The court accomplished this rather artlessly, by
turning the phrases “remain in his possession” and “make public” into “not yet
published” and “publish,” respectively, despite case law on the subject that had
drawn a clear distinction between “making public” and “publishing.”136
Reviewing precedent, the court determined that there were two possible
definitions for “publication”: 1) to intentionally make public by performance or other
means; or 2) to reproduce in tangible form capable of distribution to the public
generally or in part.137 The court leaned towards number two, but selected neither,
because it held that Blanc’s laugh had been published under either definition. But
right at the end, the opinion simply fell apart:
We are confronted with a situation where, for the purposes of this
[lawsuit], the plaintiff had created a musical composition which he
could have copyrighted under federal law and thereby secured a
limited monopoly to his exclusive performance of his intellectual
product. By failing to so protect his work, yet by electing to exploit it
commercially not only by personal performance but also by
reproducing his work in a tangible form permitting general
circulation of that composition by way of copies, I conclude that
plaintiff has lost his right to the exclusive property in the laugh. 138
The court concluded that Blanc’s Woody Woodpecker laugh was a musical song
that could be transcribed on paper and copyrighted. That’s a stretch, but possible.
134 Cal. Civil Code § 980 (1947). Section 980 had been modified by the time of the appellate
opinion in 1949: Blanc, 83 U.S.P.Q. 137, 138 (1949).
135 Cal. Civil Code § 983 (1947). Similarly, section 983 had also been modified by 1949. Blanc,
83 U.S.P.Q. at 138. It appears that the intention of the California legislature in § 983 was to create
a “mockingbird” exception whereby an imitator could intentionally, but completely independently,
duplicate the performance of a song on a record and sell it, provided that he did not try to “palm off”
the imitation as the original. The statute was substantially re-written more legibly in 1982 as
§980(a)(2). See Flo & Eddie, Inc. et. al. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc. et. al., No. CV 13-5693 PSG (RZx)
(S.D. Cal., Sept. 22, 2014).
136 Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 435 (1911) (“The public representation of a dramatic
composition, not printed and published, does not deprive the owner of his common-law right, except
by operation of statute.”) Even in RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, Judge Hand implied fairly strongly
that absent the sale of an object to the consumer, be it sheet music or a phonorecord, it is not
possible to destroy one’s common law copyright through dissemination; that is, mere distribution is
not, in itself, a sufficient condition to create divestiture. Whiteman 114 F.2dat 88-89.
137 Blanc, 83 U.S.P.Q. at 139.
138 Id. at 142.
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But even assuming a five-note song could be copyrighted, the whole discussion up to
this point had been about Blanc’s rights in the sound recording, not the composition,
including discussions of the Waring and Whiteman cases. Why the court veered off
on to composition rights, and how it came to the conclusion that having a federal
copyright in a given composition somehow alters one’s state-law rights in a sound
recording of that composition, is a mystery that will be lost forever. It wouldn’t be
the last time that a court would mash together the two. Blanc v. Lantz was a lost
opportunity.
It was not without value, however. For the first time, a state court had staked
out territory outside the boundaries that Judge Hand implied was permissible.
Judge Stevens had identified a song as a writing, as defined in the Progress
Clause.139 He determined that it was not protected by federal copyright, so was
covered by applicable state statute.140 Most importantly, he held that because it was
state law that was controlling, California law would be used to determine if Blanc’s
song was published. 141 It may not have been a very good determination, but under
Judge Hand’s formulation, once Judge Stevens recognized Blanc’s Woody
Woodpecker laugh as a writing, he should have applied the same definition of
“publish” as that used in federal copyright law. Moreover, unlike the 1909 Fonotipia
case in New York,142 California was not relying on a generalized, non-statutory
unfair competition law; Sections 980 and 983 were specific intellectual property
provisions written into the California Civil Code. It would be inaccurate to call the
law that Mel Blanc was relying on “common law copyright.” For the first time, the
dispute was over “state law copyright.” The two were not the same.143
Following Fashion Originators and RCA v. Whiteman, the next case in the line
of precedent occurred in 1955 in Capitol Records v. Mercury Records. But before it
were some suggestive lead-up cases. The first was an Illinois federal court case,
Shapiro, Bernstein v. Miracle Record Co.144 The case was poorly explained by Judge
Igoe, but apparently the Shapiro firm had issued a record containing a song written
by one Lewis that had never been copyrighted as sheet music. Miracle Records then
produced a record containing their own version of the song. Miracle argued that
their record, in keeping with the 1947 Copyright Act (which was unchanged from the
1909 Act for phonorecords and sound recordings) was not a copy of the composition.
Shapiro, Bernstein, on the other hand, argued that because the sheet music had not
yet been submitted for copyright the composition was in pre-publication status, and
thus Miracle’s record violated their common-law copyrights. The dispute was over
the composition, not the sound recording, which was never an issue, because the song
had never been recorded prior to Miracle’s version. 145
Id. at 139.
Id. at 138-139.
141 Id. at 140.
142 Fonotipia v. Bradley, 171 F. 951.
143 Traditionally, state law copyright protections have been called “common law copyright.”
However, most state-law protections for pre-1972 sound recordings are statutory, not common-law.
See e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
144 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. Miracle Record Co., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill. 1950).
145 Id. at 194. Judge Igoe was not clear about this, but never discussed any record made by
either Lewis or Shapiro, Bernstein. The latter was a well-known sheet-music publisher, not a record
company.
139
140
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Judge Igoe argued that “publication is a practical question and does not rest on
any technical definition of the word ‘copy.’” 146 Citing Learned Hand’s opinion in RCA
v. Whiteman as “very close to our case,” he concluded that when Lewis permitted his
composition to be issued on a phonorecord, it was published, and thus amounted to a
dedication to the public.147 He implied, but did not explicitly state, that if Lewis had
secured copyright of his sheet music first, then the publication of the phonorecord
would not have affected those rights. If so, this meant that issuing phonorecords
amounted to publication, leading to divestment, for state common-law copyright in
the composition. However, Judge Igoe’s use of terminology was so haphazard that it
is impossible to be certain if he meant that issuing phonorecords divested rights to
the composition or the sound recording element.148
A second, far more significant case was Metropolitan Opera v. Wagner-Nichols
Recorder Co., also decided in 1950.149 It was a fairly straightforward case. The Met
had an exclusive contract with Columbia Records to record its opera performances.
Wagner-Nichols lifted the Met’s famous Saturday afternoon radio programs and used
them to make albums competing with Columbia’s. The Met sought an injunction to
block Wagner-Nichols. There were several ancillary matters dealing with issues such
as intentional misrepresentation of goods. But the major contention between the Met
and Wagner-Nichols was the latter’s assertion that the Met had “no property right in
the broadcast performances and that [Wagner-Nichols] are therefore free to record
these performances and sell their recordings.” 150
Although it never cited the earlier New York case, Metropolitan Opera was a
throwback to the 1909 Fonotipia case.151 Its distinctive feature was the idea that
“unfair competition” could be broadened beyond the idea of “palming off” mislabeled
goods to include their actual misappropriation: “in recent years its scope has been
extended.
It has been held to apply to misappropriation as well as
misrepresentation . . . to misappropriation of what equitably belongs to a
competitor.”152 It is axiomatic that for misappropriation to occur, there must be
property to misappropriate, so it was no surprise that the court held that
the production of an opera by an opera company of great skill,
involving as it does, the engaging and development of singers,
orchestra, the training of a large chorus and the blending of the whole
by expert direction into a finished interpretive production would

Id.
Id.
148 Id. It is very likely that Judge Igoe used the phrase “common law property in the
composition” as a synonym for “sound recording.” His reference to RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman
suggests that this was his intent. On the other hand, Judge Igoe said that “when phonograph
records of a musical composition are available for purchase in every city, town and hamlet, certainly
the dissemination of the composition to the public is complete, and is as complete as by the sale of a
sheet music reproduction of the composition.” Id. at 194. We all have our bad days.
149 Metropolitan Opera Assn., Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct., 1950).
150 Metropolitan Opera, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
151 Fonotipia v. Bradley, 171 F. at 951.
152 Metropolitan Opera, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 491.
146
147
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appear to involve such a creative element as the law will recognize
and protect against appropriation by others.”153
The court also found that the broadcasts did not amount to publication. Here,
the court pulled a bit of legal bait-and-switch. After quickly running down the old
Ferris v. Frohman line of precedent, the court turned to a recent Supreme Court case,
International News Service v. Associated Press.154 But the issue in International
News wasn’t whether the press items in dispute had been published or not, but
whether they had been abandoned, a rather different thing. Abandonment turns on
the question of intent; publication depends on the extent of actual distribution
regardless of intent.155 The court then proceeded to ignore the question of whether
the Met had published its sound recordings, holding instead that it had not
abandoned its property through the broadcasts, because it had not demonstrated the
requisite intent.156
But the most cited case proved to be 1955’s Capitol Records v. Mercury
Records.157 It is justifiably famous, not for the decision itself, but for Judge Hand’s
dissent. Judge Dimock read the majority opinion. Capitol was the American agent
for Telefunken records, a German firm. Mercury distributed the same records under
license to a Czech alien properties administrator, who claimed ownership to them as
war reparations rightfully seized from Germany. The records did not contain
compositions copyrighted in the USA.
The first question was whose law applies? Judge Dimock ruled that under Erie
v. Tompkins, New York state law applied:
Since the Copyright Act does not deal with the protection of [the
sound recording element],158 we have no basis for applying federal
law. We must apply the law which would have been applied in the
courts of the state embracing the district below. . . . We must
determine what law the New York State courts would apply to
ascertain the respective rights of a plaintiff and defendant. We find a
complete dearth of authority on the question in New York and
consequently must make the decision upon principle. We believe that
where the extent of literary property within a given jurisdiction is in
question and that extent depends upon acts which have taken place
outside of that jurisdiction, the determination should be made
according to the laws of that jurisdiction as though the acts had taken
place within its borders. . . . Until we have a uniform international
law of literary property, it will be much more convenient to determine

Id. at 494.
International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1950).
155 International News Service, 248 U.S. 215 at 246. Admittedly, the Supreme Court came very
close to making the two synonymous in International News, by concluding that an “abandoned”
writing was divested into the public domain.
156 Metropolitan Opera v. Wagner-Nichols, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
157 Capitol Records v. Mercury Records, 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1955).
158 The actual language reads: “. . . does not deal with the protection of phonograph records of
the performances of public-domain compositions by virtuosos . . .” Id. at 662. It is clear from the
text of the opinion that the court means the sound recording element.
153
154
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the effect of each act by the law of the where the right of property is
expected to be exercised.159
A lot of things happen here very fast. First, Judge Dimock determines that
there is no federal question involved. These are classical compositions, in the public
domain worldwide. Under the 1909 and 1947 copyright acts, the sound recording
element of the recordings is not covered by American copyright. 160 Second, based on
this, Judge Dimock immediately declares that the rules of decision to be applied are
those of the state in which the district court is located. As we have seen, this is
contrary to the historical interpretation of the rules of decision statute,161 which
incorporates both a rule selecting state over federal law, and a choice of law selecting
the law of the state where the harm took place. Third, based on New York rules of
decision, Judge Dimock determined that because all the applicable laws in this case
were foreign laws, New York law would apply because it is “the place where the right
of property is sought to be exercised.” In other words, because that is where the court
with jurisdiction in the matter was physically situated.
What would have happened if Judge Dimock had followed both prongs of the
rules of decision, including the implied lex loci mandate of Hawkins and Day v.
Barney’s Lessee?162 He would have selected state law over federal law and tried to
apply lex loci to select the state law to be used. But that would have been impossible,
because both parties were foreign nationals disputing events that occurred in
Europe. Therefore, the court would have ended up in the same place it did: the law of
the court with jurisdiction.
The next issue Judge Dimock had to resolve was under New York law, whose
rights prevail? Through a relatively complex chain of legal reasoning based on
contract law, not copyright, Telefunken had the superior claim. 163
Now for the crucial issue: did Telefunken lose their common law copyright in the
sound recordings through publication? Up to RCA v. Whiteman (1940), the answer
would have been yes. But, according to Judge Dimock, RCA v. Whiteman had been
replaced in 1950 by Metropolitan Opera v. Wagner-Nichols. Therefore, Telefunken
had not lost their monopoly to make or sell records.164
Judge Hand’s dissent was longer than Dimock’s opinion. It was a refinement
and extension of the arguments he had been working out for a decade starting with
Fashion Originators and RCA v. Whiteman. He opened with a flat-out statement of
two principles: 1) the performance or rendition of a composition is a writing for the
purposes of the Progress Clause; and 2) it is a thing separate and apart from the
composition.165 By extension from these two principles, Congress could, if it wanted
to, grant the power of statutory copyright to the performer of a sound recording if it
were affixed in a tangible medium.

Capitol Records v. Mercury Records, 221 F.2d at 662.
Sound Recordings, limited copyright, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (adding to
section 5, title 17 of the United States Code a subsection (n) entitled “sound recordings”).
161 28 U.S.C. §1652.
162 Hawkins and Day v. Barney’s Lessee, 30 U.S. 457, 464 (1831).
163 Capitol Records, 221 F.2d at 662-663.
164 Id. at 663.
165 Id. at 664 (J. Hand, dissenting).
159
160
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However, Congress had not extended such protection. 166 Section 4 of the
Copyright Act of 1947 said that “the works for which copyright may be secured under
this title shall include all the writings of an author.”167 Therefore, all things eligible
under the Constitution for inclusion in federal copyright legislation were included in
the copyright code. That is, there was no such thing as a “writing not included
within by the Copyright Act.”168
Congress could choose to exclude a given category of writing from the protections
accorded by the copyright code. Sound recordings were an example of this. Because
sound recordings were not included, they were eligible for protection under state law.
However, because sound recordings (or any other similarly situated work) were still
“writings,” they still fell within the reach of the copyright code, and once “it is settled
that a work is within that class” of writings then “it is a federal question whether he
has published the ‘work’”169 There is no Erie-type rule of decision involved. If a work
is a writing, the question of publication is a matter of federal law because the issue is
a federal question, irrespective of the fact that the Copyright Act extends no
protection to that class of writing, leaving the task up to the states.
Why such a seemingly draconian solution, at least from the standpoint of
musical performers? Hand cited Madison’s Federalist No. 43. By the time of the
1787 constitutional convention, every state but Vermont had passed its own
copyright law. The result, in Madison’s opinion, was imminent disaster, and that
was the motivation behind the Progress Clause. 170 “If, for example in the case at
bar,” Hand noted:
the defendant is forbidden to make and sell these records in New
York, that will not prevent it from making or selling them in any
other state which may regard the plaintiff’s sales as a ‘publication’;
and it will be practically impossible to prevent their importation into
New York. That is exactly the kind of evil at which the clause [§ 4 of
the Copyright Act] is directed.171
Hand again acknowledged that “I recognize that under the view I take the plaintiff
can have only a very limited use of its records,” but “I am not satisfied that the result
is unjust, when the alternative is a monopoly unlimited both in time and in user.”172
Now, move forward to 2005. Substitute “Capitol” and “Naxos” for “Mercury” and
“Telefunken.” The case is exactly the same. The only difference is that in 1950, as
Judge Dimock briefly noted, there were no applicable international treaties or federal
law. In 2005 there was. Judge Graffeo’s opinion in Capitol v. Naxos was, in essence,
a rebuttal to Judge Hand. Dimock argued that because there was no federal law,
state law controlled. Judge Hand argued that there was applicable federal law, so it
Id.
Copyright Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 391, § 4, 61 Stat. 652, 80th Cong. (1947).
168 Id. Hand did admit that “on occasions” the Copyright Act could “disclose an opposite intent,”
but these were minor. News is one example: one does not have a copyright over the substance of a
news item, only the literal word-for-word transcription of a news broadcast. International News
Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. at 234.
169 Capital Records, 221 F.2d at 667 (J. Hand, dissenting).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
166
167
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did apply. Judge Graffeo’s argument was that although there was federal law, New
York law still prevailed.173
Capitol v. Mercury was the last major copyright case concerning sound
recordings for eighteen years. However, two tangentially related cases, both in the
Supreme Court in 1964, proved to be tremendously important. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co. and Compco Corp. v. Day-Bright Lighting were virtually identical
cases.174 Stiffel made floor lamps; Day-Bright made overhead florescent factory
lights. Both thought they had valid patents. They were wrong. Competitors copied
their well-regarded products and undersold them. Lacking valid patents, the makers
of the originals successfully sought relief under state laws designed to prevent unfair
competition. The Supreme Court overturned both lower courts. “When an article is
unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy that
article,” wrote Justice Black.175
Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require that
goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other
precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from being misled
as to the source . . . [but] a State may not when the article is
unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article
itself or award damages for such copying.176
In 1967, Barbara Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyrights, explained to a
congressional committee that:
The Supreme Court decisions in the Sears and Compco cases raise
serious doubts as to whether any rights in sound recordings survive
their publication (i.e., the first sale or distribution of
records). . . . Even though three and a half years have passed since
the Sears and Compco decisions, their full impact remains unclear
and controversial. . . . In my opinion the crucial question in deciding
whether published sound recordings are still entitled to common-law
protection is whether the pre-emption of State common law rights
applies only to works that come within the subject matter of the
present Federal copyright statute, or whether it extends to works
(like sound recordings) that are not now protected by federal
copyright, but that are Constitutionally capable of it . . . it is my view
that sound recordings are “writings of an author” and that Congress
can grant them any degree of copyright protection it sees fit.
However, they are not subject to statutory protection under the
present law, and under the Sears, Compco, and subsequent decisions,
173 Capitol v. Naxos IV, 830 N.E.2d 250, 265 (N.Y. 2005) (“Copyright protection extended by
state common law to sound recordings not covered by the federal Copyright Act is similar to the
scope of common-law ownership rights in other forms of property, which can exist
indefinitely. . . . Applying the copyright law of the situs where the infringement occurs, there is no
justification under New York law for substituting the British copyright term in place of New York’s
common-law protection . . . .”).
174 Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Bright
Lighting, Inc., 376 U. S. 234 (1964).
175 Compco Corp., 376 U.S. at 237.
176 Sears, Roebuck and Co., 376 U. S. at 232-233.
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Admittedly, Ringer’s was a rather pessimistic assessment. In both opinions the
Court had made two points: 1) while a state could not prohibit copying, their power to
regulate false labeling, deceptive advertising, fraud, or other “palming off” violations
remained untouched; and 2) the court would likely hold that that the act of copying
another’s goods, when done with the deliberate intent to create deception or to
confuse customers fell within the general category of “palming off.” 178
It was under this rationale that New York state courts continued to successfully
prosecute music piracy, most notably in a 1964 case, Capitol Records v. Greatest
Records,179 where Capitol was able to convince the court to force Greatest Records to
destroy thousands of copies of a bootleg compilation album culled from The Beatles
early singles and their first two LPs. “In the unfair competition cases Sears and
Compco, the Supreme Court held that when an article is unprotected by a patent or
copyright, state laws may not forbid others to copy that article,” but it was pointed
out that
actually what was done here was not the copying of article or good
made and sold by another, but rather the appropriation of the very
product itself . . . there is a distinction between such an act, i.e. the
copying of an idea, and the actions complained of herein, to wit, the
use of the identical product for the profit of another.180
Largely based on New York’s experience, California added its own anti-piracy
provision, Section 653h, to its penal code in 1968. 181 It became the basis of the next
major legal action.
V.
In 1971, the State of California indicted several LP bootleggers on 140 counts of
music piracy under Section 653h.182 They eventually pled guilty to ten counts, then
177 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights on S. 597,
Copyright Law Revision, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1175-79 (Letter of Barbara Ringer, Asst. Register of
Copyrights, Sept. 12, 1967).
178 Sears, Roebuck v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. at 232-33. “Doubtless a State may, in appropriate
circumstances, require that goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other
precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from being misled as to the source . . . [b]ut
because of the federal patent laws, a State may not, when the article is unpatented and
uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself.” Id.
179 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 252 N.Y.S. 2d 553 (Sup.Ct. N.Y. 1964).
180 Id. at 556. (emphasis in original)
181 See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 547 n. 1 (1973) quoting Cal. Penal Code §653h
(1971) (“(a) Every person is guilty of a misdemeanor who: (1) Knowingly and willfully transfers or
causes to be transferred any sounds recorded on a phonograph record . . . tape . . . or other such
article on which sounds are recorded, with intent to sell or cause to be sold, . . . such article on which
such sounds are transferred, without the consent of the owner.”). That the sound recording is
protected is implicit in the reference to ownership, because a public domain recording has no owner.
Id. at 548.
182 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 548.
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appealed. The law prohibited the duplication of a commercial recording for sale; the
compositions they contained were, of course, protected by federal copyright. The
Supreme Court consolidated their appeals under the name Goldstein v. California.
The defendants advanced four arguments: 1) the state law encroached on powers
reserved for the federal government; 2) the law permitted a state copyright of
unlimited duration in derogation of the “limited times” provision of the federal
Progress Clause;183 3) the law violated the Supremacy Clause provisions of the
Constitution, as established in the Sears and Compco holdings; and 4) states could
only protect unpublished writings, and under the definition of “published” in federal
law, the recordings had been divested.184
The first issue proved to be surprisingly difficult to deal with. The Progress
Clause contained no wording making patents or copyrights the exclusive domain of
the federal government, nor did it have any prohibitory language blocking the
sharing of such powers with the states. James Madison, in Federalist No. 43, did
warn against the ineffectuality of separate state copyrights, but the Chief Justice
noted that the Progress Clause “does not indicate that all writings are of national
interest or that state legislation is, in all cases unnecessary or precluded.” 185
Lacking an explicit prohibition, the important question was whether the exercise
of such power by one state prejudiced the interests of other states. The answer,
according to Berger, was no, not if the “copyright granted by a particular State has
effect only within its boundaries . . . individuals who wish to purchase a copy of a
work protected in their own State will be able to buy unauthorized copies in other
States where no protection exists.” 186 This point was repeated several times, in
different formulations. For example, the Chief Justice explained that while a state
copyright law may give a monopoly to the original producer of a record, the situation:
is no different from that which arises in regard to other state
monopolies such as a state lottery, or a food concession in a limited
enclosure like a state park; in each case citizens may escape the effect
of one State’s monopoly by making purchases in another area or
another State.187
This is an important point: Section 653h prohibited the unauthorized transfer of
a protected sound recording with the intent to sell the copy. 188 It did not prohibit the
ownership of a bootleg record or tape, so it did not prohibit the importation into the
state for personal use. Was the importation for distribution and sale prohibited?
Such importation, after all, did not meet one of the elements of the law: that there
183 In his opinion, the Chief Justice asserted that the first two of these points were a single
issue; that of impermissible unlimited duration. The implication was that the encroachment issue
was simply a predicate necessary to reach this argument. Id. at 551. However, the two were
advanced as discrete lines of argument, encroachment in Section IIa, a lengthy discussion, the latter
as Section IIb, a single paragraph. In fact, encroachment, not duration, was the real issue at hand.
184 Id. at 552-554.
185 Id. at 556-557.
186 Id. at 558.
187 Id.
188 See Cal Pen Code § 653h (“(a) Every person is guilty of misdeameanor who: (1) Knowingly
and willfully transfers or causes to be transferred any sounds recorded on a [phonorecord] or other
article on which sounds are recorded, with intent to sell or cause to be sold . . . such article on which
such sounds are so transferred, without consent of the owner . . . .”).
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must be a transfer or duplication of a protected sound recording. If the Chief
Justice’s argument was that state copyright laws were not an impermissible
incursion into federal powers only if they had no effect outside their own states’
boundaries, then the implied answer is that a state anti-piracy law would be limited
only to a prohibition on copying done within that state. Importation of an
unauthorized copy with intent to sell becomes a very gray area.189 Again, this would
become an ambiguity in Judge Graffeo’s opinion in Capitol v. Naxos IV. The fact that
Capitol Records, a corporate resident of New York, was able to use the Capitol v.
Naxos decision, ostensibly effective only within that state, to force Naxos, whose
American subsidiary is a corporate resident of Nashville, to curtail much of its
activities across the United States, leads one to wonder if it did result in just this
kind of state-vs-state trade barrier creation.190
The petitioners also argued that the California statute contained no sunset
provision, thereby giving the rights-owners to the original records an unlimited state
copyright. This was dismissed with a single paragraph. It is true that the Progress
Clause only permits Congress to grant copyrights for limited times, the Chief Justice
admitted, but California is not Congress; no such limitation applies. 191
But much of the opinion dealt with the Sears-Compco issue, a Supremacy Clause
argument: Congress had so covered the regulation of musical recordings that there
was no legitimate room for simultaneous state law involvement. 192 It turned into a
disquisition on the thorny question of whether sound recordings are “writings,” and
what their status was under the 1909 and 1947 copyright acts. Phonorecords (as
opposed to sound recordings) were writings, the Chief Justice argued, and Congress
had included them within the Copyright Act. It had made some provision for them: if
the phonorecord was of a copyrighted song, the composer (not the performer) received
a mechanical royalty of two cents. 193 Otherwise, there was no financial consideration
provided for. This neatly answered the question of whether phonorecords were
writings while ducking the thorny question of whether sound recordings were
writings, which was the real issue at hand. Unlike the patented items in Sears and
Compco, the entire field of protection was therefore not usurped; Congress had

189 Section 1(a) of both the 1909 and 1947 Copyright Acts did state that copyright consisted of
the exclusive right “To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work.” Pub. L.
Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909); Pub.L. 391, 61 Stat. 652, 80th Cong (1947). (emphasis
added) However, sound recordings were not federally copyrighted. On October 15, 1971, Congress
had passed Public Law 92-140, amending the 1947 Copyright Act to add sound recordings. Pub.L
92-140, 85 Stat. 391, 92nd Cong. (1971). The new section 1(f) read: “To reproduce and distribute to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending, reproductions of the
copyrighted work if it be a sound recording.” (emphasis added) However, as Chief Justice Berger
noted, the Goldstein case was adjudicated using the 1909/1947 law because the allegedly infringing
recordings were affixed prior to February 15, 1972, the effective date of Public Law. 92-140.
Goldstein, 412 U.S. 546, 562 n.17.
190 According to Klaus Heymann, owner of Naxos International, his firm ultimately negotiated a
consent agreement with Capitol whereby Naxos would not import any EMI historical recordings
anywhere into the United States. NICHOLAS SOAMES, THE STORY OF NAXOS: THE EXTRAORDINARY
STORY OF THE INDEPENDENT RECORD LABEL THAT CHANGED CLASSICAL RECORDING FOREVER, 118
(Piatkus Press, 2012).
191 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. at 560.
192 Id. at 561.
193 Id. at 566.
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clearly left an area of regulation up to the states. 194 Chief Justice Berger never did
make a definite statement about what was or wasn’t a “writing.” “[A]lthough the
word ‘writings’ might be limited to script or printed material, it may be interpreted to
include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative or aesthethic labor,” he
wrote.195
The next question was: did “writings,” as defined in Section 4 of the 1909 and
1947 copyright acts, include everything that was eligible for copyright under the
Progress Clause? If the answer was “yes,” that meant that sound recordings were
already subject to the full protection of federal authority, even if that “protection”
was equivalent to “no copyright coverage.” If the answer was “no,” that meant that
there were things that were “writings” that Congress had excluded from the
copyright code. They were writings, but they weren’t covered by the code. The Chief
Justice determined that the answer was “no.”196 It was possible for a work to be a
“writing,” but outside the copyright code. Sound recordings were one of these works.
Actually, it would be more accurate to say they had been outside the copyright act,
and the fact that Congress had already acted to change their status was evidence
that helped prove his point.197 Public Law 92-140, passed by Congress in October
1971, added sound recordings to the class of works eligible for copyright protection,
effective February 15, 1972. As a necessary precondition to this, both houses of
Congress had to explicitly recognize that sound recordings were “writings,” which
they did in committee findings in 1971.198
The Chief Justice dealt with one last argument which he believed was so minor
that it warranted only a footnote, but that became one of the most frequently cited
paragraphs of the majority opinion. The petitioners had argued that the original
record companies had published the LPs through sale to the general public, thereby
divesting them into the public domain. Burger declined to make a decision on this
issue, relegating it to Footnote 28:
We have no need to determine whether, under state law these
recordings had been published or what legal consequences such
publication might have. For purposes of federal law, “publication”
serves only as a term of art which defines the legal relationships
which Congress has adopted under the federal copyright statutes. As
to categories of writings which Congress has not brought within the
scope of the federal statute, the term has no application.199
The Chief Justice may have believed that it was insignificant, but this dicta was
actually of tremendous importance. In effect, it disavowed Judge Hand’s dissent in
Id. at 562.
Id. at 561
196 Id. at 568.
197 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. at 568-569.
The Chief Justice relied very heavily on
Congress’s determination “that recordings qualified as ‘writings’ within the meaning of the
Constitution, but had not previously been protected under the federal copyright statute.” Id.
198 Id. at 568, citing H.R. 92-487 2, 5 (1971) and S.REP. NO. 92-74, 4 (1971). Berger’s implication
that Congress’s decision to permit the copyrighting of sound recordings was made after a finding
that they were writings suggests that he believed the determination of what is or is not a writing
was a discretionary decision for Congress to make.
199 Id. at 570, n. 28.
194
195
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Capitol Records v. Mercury Records200 and the line of reasoning he had developed
from Fashion Originators and RCA v. Whiteman. In the earlier cases, Hand had
argued that the federal definition of “publication” controlled, even in state copyright
cases, because the Erie-rule choice of law didn’t apply. In Capitol Records v. Mercury
Records he went further and declared that any copyright case, whether it dealt with
federal or state law, was actually a federal question, because the subject of the
dispute was a “writing” as defined in the Progress Clause. In Footnote 28, Chief
Justice Berger flatly stated that unless it was a matter dealing with federal
copyright, the definition of publication was a matter of state law. 201
It was a close decision, 5–4. There were two dissents. One was grounded in
Sears, Compco, and Judge Hand’s dissent in Capitol Records v. Mercury Records;202
the other in a text of the Copyright Act itself. 203 Both said nearly the same thing.
Justice Douglas, writing for himself and Justices Brennan and Blackmun, argued
that the Copyright Act incorporated everything that was a “writing,” that is,
everything Constitutionally capable of copyright. Section 5 of the Act then listed
those things that were intended for protection through registration.
Sound
recordings weren’t there. Thus, sound recordings were covered by copyright law, but
their “coverage” amounted to “zero,” to nothing. Because they were covered by
federal law, albeit without protection, state law was preempted. The most important
priority was, as Judge Hand noted, that there must be consistency between state-law
and federal-law protections.204
Justice Marshall, on the other hand, came to the same conclusion through a
slightly different path of reasoning: the protections given to sound recording in the
federal copyright code were so absent that it indicated that Congress had
affirmatively chosen a policy of imposing no restrictions on infringement, and
therefore states were blocked from enacting their own anti-piracy laws.205
Both sides noted that their opinions were somewhat transitional because, as
Chief Justice Berger noted, the law had changed.
VI.
The process of researching, drafting, debating, then finally replacing the
1909/1947 Copyright Act stretched all the way from 1955 to 1976. In 1967, Barbara
Ringer, Register of Copyrights, wrote the Senate copyright subcommittee that “there
is no doubt in my mind that recorded performances represent the ‘writings of an

Capitol Records v. Mercury Records, 221 F.2d at 662.
Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 570, n. 28.
202 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 572 (J. Douglas, J. Brennan and J. Blackmun, dissenting).
203 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 576 (J. Marshall, dissenting).
204 Id. at 575 (J. Douglas, dissenting). In 2012, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority in
Golan v. Holder, appeared to categorically reject the idea of a “zero length copyright term,” that is,
the inclusion of a subcategory of writings into federal copyright coverage only for the purpose of
moving them immediately upon inclusion into the public domain without any period of protection.
Golan v. Holder 132 S.Ct. 873, 885 (2012).
205 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 579 (J. Marshall, dissenting).
200
201
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author’ in the Constitutional sense, and are as fully creative and worthy of copyright
protection as translations, arrangements or any other class of derivative works.” 206
Between October, 1971, when the 1909 version of the Copyright Act’s section on
sound recordings was modified (effective February 15, 1972), 207 and October 19, 1976,
when it was entirely replaced,208 sound recordings lived in sort of a legal shadowland.
Before 1972, music legally existed, as far as the federal government was concerned,
only in the form of musical compositions written on paper. Even after February 15,
1972 the old mechanical rights fee system was retained, and a cassette tape could not
be submitted to the Copyright Office in lieu of a paper score to register a
composition.209 However, a new “Class N” copyright (Sound Recording) was added to
the traditional “Class E” (Musical Composition) copyright. Class N material included
“works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken or other sounds,”
including music, drama, or narration. Only works first affixed onto a tangible
medium and published after February 15, 1972 were eligible for submittal.210 Under
Class N only the sound content itself was protected. Unlike books and other works,
which were required to bear the circle-C symbol, copyrighted sound recordings had to
carry a circle-P symbol.211
By the time the second draft of the new legislation was issued in early 1975, it
was a dead letter whether a performance fee system for the sound recording would be
added to the existing composer-based mechanical rights fee system. Overwhelmed by
the radio and jukebox industries, the existing mechanical rights fee for compositions
would be adjusted, but that was it. Congress eventually kicked the can down the
road on performance rights to 1978, authorizing a Copyright Office study on the
matter.212
On the other hand, the situation as to whether sound recordings would be made
copyright-eligible was much different. Phonorecords would now comport to the
international standards for all copyrightable works—they would be a unified creative
product, no longer split between a “composition” and a “sound recording.” Moreover,
because formalities such as renewal, filing and marking were now seen as merely
“traps for the unwary,” all creative works, not just music, would be automatically
copyrighted at the moment they were affixed to a tangible medium. 213 While
registering a work made it much easier for an author to prove originality, and often
entitled her to seek enhanced damages in court, it was no longer a mandatory
precondition to copyright. Finally, the copyright term was changed from a fixed
number of years to one based on the author’s life (at the time, life plus 50 years). 214

206 Hearings on S. 597: Copyright Law Revision, April 28, 1968, “Letter of Barbara A. Ringer,
Register of Copyrights, September 12, 1967”, 1175-1178.
207 Sound Recordings, limited copyright, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
208 The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2591 (1976).
209 Sound Recordings, limited copyright, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 1(a), 85 Stat. 391 (1971); 17
U.S.C. § 1(f).
210 Amendments to 37 C.F.R. § 202, “Registration of Claims to Copyright”, 37 Fed. Reg. 3055
(Feb. 11, 1972).
211 Id.
212 Performance Rights in Sound Recordings, H.R. REP. NO. 22-046 (1978).
213 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (Historical and Revision Notes).
214 The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, title I, § 101, 90 Stat. 2591 (1976); 17 U.S.C.
§ 302.
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To some degree, the “unity” concept allowed Congress to circumvent the problem
of performers’ rights. Even after the 1972 interim revisions, the Copyright Office
required a composer to submit sheet music for a Class E registration. That meant an
artist could not improvise an unscored tune, record it, and send it in with a Form E
application. It was only eligible for a Class N (sound recording) registration. 215 But
after the 1976 Act, a musician had the choice of sending it in as sheet music with a
Form E to register a printed composition, or as cassette tape with a Form PA/PAU
(Performing Arts Unitary Work) to register it as a basic non-dramatic musical work,
which protected the unitary musical song. That allowed a musician to copyright an
improvised tune with herself as both composer and performer, then register it with
one of the rights societies such as BMI and ASCAP for mechanical royalties. (ASCAP
held out for a few years after BMI and SESAC in requiring sheet music with their
registration.)216 If the artist was performing someone else’s composition, he would
send a cassette tape and a Form SR to receive a copyright just for the sound
recording. It wasn’t a great system, and it was widely abused by producers and
managers, who often added themselves as co-writer to new songs without the artist’s
knowledge, but it was better than the pre-1972 setup.217
While the 1971 copyright revisions solved many of the problems plaguing the
owners of sound recordings made after February 15, 1972, it did little to rectify the
pre-existing problems of those who had recorded before then. And in some ways the
new 1976 Act put these artists in an even more awkward legal position than before.
Section 303 of the 1976 Copyright Act contained a “sweeping” provision intended to
assign copyright terms to everything that had been not been copyright-eligible under
the old law, but was now copyrightable under the 1976 legislation. 218 It did not
specifically mention phonorecords, indicating that they were probably originally
intended for inclusion along with everything else similarly situated.
A new Section 301 was also added. It specified the breadth and intent of federal
preemption.219 It was an attempt to codify what the majority had determined in
215 Amendments to 37 C.F.R. § 202, “Registration of Claims to Copyright”, 37 Fed. Reg. 3055
(Feb. 11, 1972).
216 37 C.F.R. § 202 (2009); STANLEY SADIE, THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND
MUSICIANS (Macmilliam, 1980): IV, 752.
217 For more information, see Copyright Office circulars 56 and 56a, supra note 10.
218 See The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 303, 90 Stat. 2591 (1976) (“303. Works
created but not published or copyrighted before January 1, 1978. Copyright in a work created before
January 1, 1978, but not theretofore in the public domain or copyrighted, subsists from January 1,
1978 and endures for the terms provided by section 302. In no case, however, shall the term of
copyright expire before December 31, 2002, and if the work is published on or before December 31,
2002, the term of copyright shall not expire before December 31, 2047.”). Note: The terms referred to
as “provided by section 302” were life plus 50 years for an individual; 75 years from publication or
100 years from creation for a group product or a work for hire. These terms were extended in 1998
in the Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (amending 17 U.S.C.
§§ 302, 304). The text of section 303 cited above was amended unchanged to become § 303(a) by Pub.
L. 105-298, title I, § 102 (c), 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
219 See The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 301, 90 Stat. 2591 (1976)
(“301. Preemption with respect to other laws. (a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable
rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and
come within the subject of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or
after that date and whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished,
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Goldstein: if a work was a writing and was protected by federal copyright, it could not
simultaneously be protected by state law, but if a work was a writing and was not
protected by federal law then it was eligible for coverage under state law.
The problem was that some things had been determined by the courts to be both
a writing and inherently ineligible for copyright. One example was pure factual
material. While Telephone Company A could not simply photocopy Telephone
Company B’s phone book, the factual material in A’s book was not protected: if B
wanted to transcribe out every name and number, re-type the information and
publish their own book, that was okay, because pure facts in themselves are
insufficiently original to qualify for protection.220 Section 301 was written so as not
to permit a state to pass legislation, subsequent to such a ruling, to start protecting
telephone books in its jurisdiction. 221
But fairly late in the process of marking up the bill, in mid-1975, the Attorney
General’s office voiced an objection that Section 301 “could be read as abrogating the
antipiracy laws now existing in 29 States relating to pre-February 15, 1972 sound
recordings,” and recommended that a new provision be added to specifically exclude
pre-1972 sound recordings from federal preemption.222 In the Goldstein case, the
Supreme Court had declined to comment on whether it believed that California’s
anti-music piracy statute fell within the “palming off” exception, so the Attorney
General’s concern was a legitimate one. If state statutes such as California’s Section
653h were considered “palming off” laws, directed at unfair business practices, they
would not be preempted by Section 301, but if they only extended rights to authors
equivalent to those within the ambit of federal copyright, they would be preempted.
In the final Senate deliberations a short new subpart (iv) was added to
subsection 301(b) that specifically blocked the preemptive powers of the draft
Copyright Act in regards to state anti-music piracy laws for pre-1972 records.223 This
is how the Senate-approved version of the bill read when it was sent to the House in
December of 1975. In early 1976, the House’s version of Section 301(b) was altered.
Subpart (iv) was dropped and replaced with a subsection dealing with architectural
are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such work under the
common law or statutes of any State. (b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or
remedies under common or statutes of any State with respect to: (i) [any material not listed in
sections 102 and 103 as subject to copyright]; (ii) [any lawsuit already commenced before January 1,
1978]; (iii) [any state law that is not equivalent to a federal copyright protection]”).
220 Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991). See
also MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][2] (2012). Compare
this to a firm that publishes a used-car price guide, or a guide to estimating the probability that the
computer hard disc of a specific make, model, age and extent of use will fail. These are facts, but are
arrived at through the skill and originality of the author. They are therefore protected. See Bruce
Epperson, Uncertain and Unverifyable: Jazz Metadiscography and the Paradox of Originality, ARSC
JOURNAL 39, 2 (Fall 2008): 215-239.
221 The distinction is subtle; recall the dissent of Justice Marshall in Goldstein, who argued that
given the language of § 1(e) of the 1909-1947 copyright codes, Congress had placed sound recordings
in the same category as the factual content of telephone books—things it did not want to protect by
copyright, and that it did not want the states to protect under copyright, either.
222 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany S.22, Report 94-473, at 116, 94th Cong. (Nov.
1975).
223 Sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972: Hearings Before the House Subcommittee of
the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 2223, Copyright Law Revision, May-December 1975, 137-139
(Testimony of Irwin Goldbloom , Department of Justice).
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landmarks, and a new subsection (c) was added just for pre-1972 sound recordings.224
In commenting on this change, the House legislative report says only that:
In its testimony during the 1975 hearings, the Department of Justice
pointed that under section 301 as then written, “This language could
be read as abrogating the anti-piracy laws now existing in 29
states. . . . The Department recommended that section 301(b) be
amended to exclude sound recordings affixed prior to February 15,
1972 from the effect of preemption. The committee adopted this
suggestion. The result of the Senate amendment would be to leave
pre-1972 sound recordings as entitled to perpetual protection under
State law, while post-1972 recordings would eventually fall into the
public domain as provided in the bill. The Committee recognizes
that, under recent court decisions, pre-1972 recordings are protected
by State statute or common law, and that they should not all be
thrown into the public domain instantly upon the coming into effect of
the new law. However, it cannot agree that they should in effect be
accorded perpetual protection, as under the Senate amendment, and
it has therefore revised clause (4) to establish a future date for the
pre-emption to take effect.225
It is true that the Attorney General’s proposed solution of simply adding a new line
item to the list of exceptions in subsection 301(b) would probably have thrown
state-law copyright protection over them in perpetuity, but that could have been
fixed relatively simply. Instead, the solution actually implemented was far broader.
Take the new subsection 301(c) one sentence at a time. “With respect to sound
recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, any rights or remedies under the common
law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled or limited by this title until
February 15, 2047.”226
Section 301(a) preempts the application of state law if it duplicates federal
copyright law and if the state law attempts to protect material that is
copyrightable.227 The above paragraph overrides this federal preemption (since
extended until 2067), thereby preserving state statutory and common-law remedies
for pre-1972 sound recordings. This sentence could have been written to simply
disable subsection 301(a) for pre-1972 sound recordings, but it does not do this. The
block against preemption here is, in fact, broader in scope. Subsection (a) preempts
only those state laws that are “within the general scope of copyright as specified by

224 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (“With respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, any
rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled or limited by
this title until February 15, 2047. The preemptive provisions of subsection (a) shall apply to any
such rights and remedies pertaining to any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced on
or after February, 15, 2047. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 303, no sound recording fixed
before February 15, 1972 shall be subject to copyright under this title before, on or after February
15, 2047.”).
225 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (2012) (Historical and Revision Notes).
226 Extended to 2067 in the Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998) (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304).
227 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2010) (Historical and Revision Notes).
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section 106.”228 That is, the rights conferred by being federally copyrighted. But this
sentence blocks all preemptions against state rights or remedies that are equivalent
to any protection anywhere in the copyright code, not just in Section 106, because it
refers to “rights or remedies” that may be “annulled or limited” by anything “under
this title” not to “rights that are equivalent to any . . . in section 106,” the language
used in subsection (a).
This is not a mere semantic distinction. Three important sections of the
Copyright Act that define rights in sound recordings are not located in Section 106:
Section 104 (“subject matter of copyright: national origin”); Section 114 (“scope of
exclusive rights in sound recordings”) and Section 115 (“compulsory license for
making and distributing phonorecords”).229 Section 104 establishes the basic criteria
whereby foreign-origin works are protected by U.S. copyright law. Subsection 104(a)
gives domestic protection to a sound recording first fixed in a foreign country,
provided that nation is a treaty party with the United States, but regardless of
whether the sound recording is considered published or unpublished under United
States law.230 Section 114 nullifies the right of performance in sound recordings
given to other works in subsection 106(4) substituting the mechanical royalty fees for
composers administered by ASCAP, BMI and SESAC. Section 115 does the same
thing, only for the pressing of records and tapes, again substituting the mechanical
fee formula.231
The breadth of this block to preemption does have a significant affect on how
states treat pre-1972 phonorecords under their state law. In September, 2014, the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of California held that Section 980(a)
of the California Civil Code accorded the owners of the sound recording aspect of
pre-1972 sound recordings a right to seek performance royalties from all
broadcasters, both traditional broadcast radio stations and digital new media
transmitters.232 This right is actually broader than what exists for post-1972 under
the federal copyright code. Subsection 106(6) of the copyright code, added in 1995,
created a new performance right, but only for works disseminated by digital audio
transmission and only for copyrighted works (i.e., those recorded after February 15,
1972).233 Otherwise, Section 114(a) expressly prohibits any right of performance
outside the existing mechanical rights fee system. But the California federal court
ruled that state law encompassed both digital and traditional transmitters, including
broadcast radio stations.
A New York federal district court subsequently issued a series of rulings that
effectively granted summary judgment to the same plaintiffs as in the California
See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2010) (Historical and Revision Notes) supra, note 218.
17 U.S.C. §§ 104, 104(a), 114, 115 (2012).
230 17 U.S.C. §§ 104(a), (2012).
231 17 U.S.C. §§ 114, 115 (2010) (Historical and Revision Notes). In 2002, a performers’ right
(i.e. a right in the sound recording element) was added at § 106(6): “the owner of copyright under
this title has the exclusive right . . . (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.” Pub, L. 107-273, div. C, title III,
§13210(4)(A), 116 Stat. 1909 (2002). It does not extend to traditional broadcast radio stations or
phonorecords, which continue as before.
232 Flo and Eddie, Inc. et. al. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc. et. al, CV13-5693 PSG(RZx) (S.D. Cal.,
Sept. 22, 2014).
233 Digital Performance Rights in Sound Records Act, Pub. L. 104-39, § 2 (1995), 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(6) (2012).
228
229
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case, pending a decision by the plaintiffs as to whether they wished to proceed with
the litigation as a class action suit or as individual plaintiffs. The primary difference
from the California case was that the performance right for pre-1972 records was
based on New York state common law, not a specific statute. 234
If the block to preemption in subsection 301(c) was limited only to nullifying the
preemptive effects of subsection 301(a), these state-based actions would not be
possible. Sections 114 and 115 act as substitutes for subsection 106(4); that is, the
exclusive right of an owner to perform his or her work.235 Thus, it is an open
question whether they are “within the general scope of copyright as specified in
Section 106.”236 But there is no ambiguity as to whether Sections 114 and 115 are
within Title 17. Thus, subsection 303(a) blocks any assertion that the nature of the
protection they extend to post-1972 copyrightable records precludes the parallel
application of state law to pre-1972 records. While some of the provisions of the
copyright code preclude the application of some equivalent state laws to post-1972
phonorecords, it is clear that the block to preemption afforded to pre-1972
phonorecords incorporates all possible preemptions that may be thrown up by any
provision of the copyright code.
Another example of how this broad block works against the preclusive effect of
federal copyright law can be found in the Capitol Records v. Naxos IV decision.
There, Judge Graffeo was faced with two conflicting laws in determining whether the
English-origin classical recordings were in the public domain in the United States.
The Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) both specified
something called the “Rule of the Shorter Term,” which says that the copyright
duration in the nation of first publication (England) determines the copyright in all
other nations, thus making the public domain date everywhere 1986 or earlier. 237
New York state law, on the other hand lasts until 2067, when the block against
federal preemption lifts.238 Judge Graffeo ruled that New York law was superior to
the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) because New
York rights and remedies are preserved under Section 301(c) of the Copyright Act. 239
The Berne and UCC documents, as international treaties, are empowered through
the Copyright Act, but they are not “exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by Section 106,” because they are not American copyrights.240

234 Flo and Eddie, Inc. et. al. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc. et. al., 13-CV-5784(CM) (S.D.N.Y.) (def’s.
motion for summary judgment denied Nov. 14, 2014; def’s. motion to reconsider denied, Dec. 12,
2014; decision and order on def’s. reply to court’s show-cause order why plaintiffs should not be
granted summary judgment, Jan. 15, 2015).
235 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (“Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright
under this title has the exclusive right to do and authorize any of the following . . . (4) in the case of
literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works.”).
236 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)
237 Not all of the recordings in Capitol v. Naxos fell into the U.K. public domain at the same
time. The date of 1986 is used by commentators because that was the date the last one did so.
Capitol Records v. Naxos (Capitol v. Naxos I), 262 F. Supp.2d 204, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
238 17 U.S.C § 303(a) (2004); 17 U.S.C § 303(a) (2012).
239 Capitol Records v. Naxos (Capitol v. Naxos IV), 830 N.E. 2d 250, 265 (N.Y. 2005).
240 They are rights empowered through § 104A of the current copyright code. Golan v. Holder,
132 S. Ct. at 881-82.
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The second sentence reads: “The preemptive provisions of subsection (a) shall
apply to any such rights and remedies pertaining to any cause of action arising from
undertakings commenced on or after February, 15, 2047.”241
At first, this sentence appears contradictory. The first sentence has its own
sunset provision: it will “turn itself off” and end the block to preemption on the
designated date, now February 15, 2067. This sentence appears to do the opposite: it
will “turn on” that same block on the same day. But it is not contradictory, because
what is being “turned on” is much less than is what is being “switched off” in the
preceding sentence. The block being deactivated is a block to any preemption arising
anywhere within Title 17. What replaces it is a block to federal preemption only for
powers originating in Section 106 of the Copyright Code. This is, of course, the basic
level of federal preemption accorded to anything that is covered by federal copyright.
As I explained in my discussion of the preceding sentence, it is problematic whether a
state will still have to power to invoke its own equivalents of Sections 114 or 115, or
what its powers will be in circumstances where there is a conflict of laws between its
state law and the laws and treaty powers of a foreign nation. However these may be
interpreted, one thing is for certain: the result will be a long way from the public
domain.
Finally, the third sentence reads: “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of Section
303, no sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972 shall be subject to copyright
under this title before, on or after February 15, 2047.”242
This sentence has also been extended to 2067 since it was adopted. It does one,
and maybe two, things. The first is obvious: had it not been inserted, pre-1972
phonorecords would have been swept up into federal copyright by Section 303 along
with all older, pre-1978 writings. Now, they will remain in the same limbo they have
been in since the 1909 Copyright Act.
But is there a second effect? For the preemption in subsection 301(a) to be
effective, two conditions must be met: 1) the state action to be preempted must fall
within the general scope of federal copyrights as defined in Section 106; and 2) the
work affected “must come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by
Sections 102 and 103.”243 But while “musical works” are listed in subsection 102(2),
pre-1972 sound recordings are, in subsection 301(c), not “subject to copyright.” So are
they still included within the “subject matter of copyright” under Section 102 or 103?
In other words, when this sentence says that “no sound recording . . . shall be subject
to copyright . . . on before or after February 15, 2047 [2067],” is it possible that it
removes pre-1972 phonorecords from “the subject matter of copyright” and therefore
makes the (a) paragraph inapplicable? If so, the net effect would be that on February
15, 2067, absolutely nothing changes. Pre-1972 phonorecords would remain in
state-law copyright in perpetuity.
David Nimmer, the copyright authority, believes, based on the final House
Report of September 3, 1976, that Congress did not plan to leave pre-1972 sound
recordings in common-law protection in perpetuity; that there was a clear intent to

241 Since 1998, the date is now 2067. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (amending 17
U.S.C. §§ 302, 304).
242 Id.
243 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012).
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send them into the public domain on a specific date based on what the copyright term
would be for a comparable post-1972 recording.244
In addition, the Historical and Revision Notes (House Report 94-1476) attached
to Section 301, in discussing subsection 301(c), states that “the Committee recognizes
pre-1972 recordings are protected by state statute or common law, and that not all
should be thrown into the public domain instantly upon the coming into effect of the
new law. However, it cannot agree that they should in effect be accorded perpetual
protection under the Senate Amendment [by simply listing them as exempt under
proposed Section 301(b)(iv)] and has therefore revised clause (4) to establish a future
date for the preemption to take effect. The date chosen is February 15, 2047 . . . .”245
But note the careful language: the Committee was concerned about the date when
pre-1972 recordings would enter the public domain, so they set a date for preemption
to take effect. The imposition of preemption [i.e. the removal of state-based
protection] is not the same thing as entry into the public domain.
This was made clear in a recent case, Golan v. Holder, dealing with the issue of
whether the United States had the power to move material in the public domain back
into copyright-protected status to meet its obligations under the Berne Convention,
the Court was presented with an argument that the “limited times” provision of the
Progress Clause could include a term of zero length. In other words, that the United
States had the power to pull a category of writings into copyright-protected status
expressly for the purpose of immediately moving them to the end of term and into the
public domain:
The text of the Copyright Clause does not exclude application of
copyright protection to works in the public domain. Petitioners’
contrary argument relies primarily on the Constitution’s confinement
to a limited [term] . . . . Our decision in Eldred246 is largely dispositive
of petitioners’ limited-time argument. There we addressed the
question whether Congress violated the Copyright Clause when it
extended, by 20 years the terms of existing copyrights 247 . . . we
declined to infer from the text of the Copyright Clause “the command
that a time prescription, once set, becomes forever ‘fixed’ or
‘inalterable’”. . . . The difference, petitioners say, is that the limited
time had already passed for works in the public domain. What was
that limited term for foreign works once excluded from U.S. copyright
protection? Exactly “zero, petitioners respond . . . .” [B]y refusing to
provide any protection for a work, “Congress set[s] the term at zero,”
and thereby “tell[s] us when the end has come.” We find scant sense
in this argument, for surely a “limited time” of exclusivity must begin
before it may end.248
244 See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][2][d][ii], n521
(2012); Copyright Law Revision: Report Together with Additional Views to Accompany S.22, at 133,
Report 94-1476, 94th Cong. (1976).
245 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (Historical and Revision Notes).
246 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
247 Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
248 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. at 881(citations omitted, emphasis added); See also MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9A.02[A][2] (2012).
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Based on this, I believe it is premature to assume that pre-1972 phonorecords
will move into the public domain on February 15, 2067. The most that can be
assumed is that they will pass out of state-law copyright control on that date.
However, what is central to this narrative is what Judge Graffeo thought, and her
opinion clearly stated that she interpreted Section 303 to mean that pre-1972
phonorecords will move out of the protective control of New York state law on
February 15, 2067.249 Whether this meant entry into the public domain or something
else is a matter she chose not to comment on.
VII.
In a coincidence, the timing of the new 1971 sound recording amendments along
with a brilliant new theory advanced by a New York federal court judge, almost
revolutionized copyright law in regard to phonorecords, both in their composition and
sound recording aspects. Alas, Judge Gurfein was a prophet before his time.
Rosette v. Rainbow Records was a 1973 dispute over composition rights. With
the exception of Mel Blanc’s “Woody Woodpecker” case in 1949, almost every case up
to this point had been a dispute about whether issuing phonorecords publishes the
sound recording, not the composition of the songs on the disc.250 Marion Rosette was
a composer and performer of children’s songs, most based on classic fairy and folk
tales. She had been issuing records since about 1964; all in dispute came from the
pre-1972 period. Rainbow issued dubbings of at least 33 of her songs. Rosette had
not registered federal copyright in any of her compositions, so she sued under New
York state law. Rainbow asserted that by issuing records, Rosette had published her
compositions, divesting them to the public. 251
Reviewing precedent, Judge Gurfein found little guidance. Shapiro, Bernstein v.
Miracle Records252 (1950), implied, but didn’t directly state, that publication divested
composition rights. Mills Music v. Cromwell Music 253 (1954), stated so outright, but
the point was tangential to the case. The same was true for McIntire v. Double A
Music254 (1958). The one exception was Nom Music v. Kaslin255 (1964), in which the
court held that issuing records did not publish the composition because records were
not copies under the copyright code. (Only Shapiro, Bernstein has been discussed in
this article so far.)
The problem was that Section 2 of the 1909 and 1947 copyright acts gave almost
unlimited protection to “unpublished” works. 256 The two-cents per copy “mechanical
249 See Capitol Records v. Naxos (Capitol v. Naxos IV), 830 N.E. 2d at 265 (“Until 2067, no
federal or state statutory impediment constricts this common-law durational component for
pre-1972 sound recordings”).
250 Blanc, 83 U.S.P.Q. 137 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1949).
251 Rosette v. Rainbow Record Mfg. Corp. 354 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
252 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp. 473 (D. Ill. 1950).
253 Mills Music, Inc. v Cromwell Music, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
254 McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp., 166 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Cal. 1958)
255 Nom Music, Inc. v. Kaslin, 227 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
256 Pub. L. No. 391, 61 Stat. 652, 80th Cong. (1947), (1947 Copyright Act), 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1960)
(“Nothing in this title shall be constituted to annul or limit the right of an author or proprietor of an
unpublished work, at common law, or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such
unpublished work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefore.”).
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reproduction” fee provision in Section 1(e) obviously required a registration system
(called a “notice of use”), but Section 5 of the Act didn’t include phonorecords as
works eligible for copyright, and of course White-Smith Music had deemed that
records were not copies.257 Lacking any help from precedent, and forced to admit
that the Copyright Act was the problem, not the cure, he devised his own solution—
one as simple as it was clever:
[T]he use of phonograph records without compliance with the
Copyright Act bars claims for infringement not because the record is
a “copy” or a “publication,” but because any other interpretation leads
to a conflict with the Federal statutory scheme. Section 2 would still
be read as applying to unpublished works protectable at common law
including unpublished musical compositions where no mechanical
recordings have been made.
On the other hand the failure to file notice of use does not bar
the copyright owner forever. By analogy then, I hold that the sale of
phonograph records is not a divestment of common law rights by
publication but that it does inhibit suit against infringers until the
statutory copyright is obtained and the notice of use is filed.258
Gurfein proposed that a composer who had neither published her composition as
sheet music nor issued it on a record would be treated the same as any other author
of undistributed manuscript material. She would be covered by state common law
copyright, regardless of whether her “manuscript” was a book, sheet music or an
uncirculated record. Once the composer had circulated her song on a record, without
securing a Class E sheet music copyright or filing the notice of use for her
two-cent-per-copy mechanical royalty, others would be free to use it without cost. 259
In addition, they would be immune from suit by her for state common-law copyright
infringement. However, the author’s compositions would not be permanently
divested into the public domain, because phonorecords aren’t copies. Thus, once the
author had secured her Class E copyright, other parties would be obligated to file
notice and start paying mechanical fee royalties. The author could also start to use
state common law to enjoin any further illegal record sales under unfair business
practices statutes or anti-music piracy laws.
The real beauty of this system is that it could be made to work just as well for
sound recordings. Because sound recordings made after February 1972 were
separately copyrightable under Class N, 260 Gurfein’s solution pointed a way towards
a workable method for pulling pre- and post-1972 recordings into a single system. A
pre-1972 recording could be dubbed by others, because it wasn’t a “copy,” but once it
was registered under the new system, such duplication had to cease because it then
met the definition of “pirated” music under state laws. The appeals court upheld
both Gurfein’s decision and his award of $14,300, but offered no commentary on his
White-Smith Music Publishing Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
Rosette, 354 F. Supp.at 1193 (citations omitted).
259 The mechanics are further explained in Norbay Music, Inc. v. King Records, Inc., 290 F.2d
617 (2d Cir. 1961).
260 37 Fed. Reg. 3055 (Feb. 11, 1972) (amendments to 37 C.F.R. § 202).
257
258
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novel approach. 261 In any event, it was now late 1976, and Congress had finally seen
fit to replace the interim copyright revision with a complete overhaul, one that, at
least for new records, obviated the need for his system. 262
One of the first court cases interpreting the 1976 Copyright Act occurred in 1986
in Jones v. Virgin Records,263 which involved a dispute over the well-known song
“Handyman,” a three-time Billboard top 25 single. Composers Jimmy Jones and Otis
Blackwell, under the name Shalimar Music Corporation, registered “Handyman” as
sheet music in 1959. It was published on paper in 1964. Jones recorded it in 1960,
Del Shannon in 1964, James Taylor in 1977, and George O’Dowd (Boy George) in
1983. Jones and Blackwell registered a unitary Performing Arts work in August
1984 using a PA/PAU registration and by submitting a cassette tape. 264
Jones and Blackwell alleged that O’Dowd copied elements of “Handyman” that
were unique to the 1960 phonorecord version (but were not contained in the 1959
sheet music version). O’Dowd countered that the 1960 version was in the public
domain through publication. Judge Lowe dusted off the Rosette v. Rainbow Records
decision and updated it to make it work in the post-1976 Copyright Act environment,
the only known example where this was done. 265
Judge Lowe rejected O’Dowd’s argument that the 1960 record of “Handyman”
published the composition on the grounds that a phonorecord could not be a copy of
the composition it contained. Instead, he folded the 1976 Copyright Act into the
Rosette decision, using the 1984 date in which Jones and Blackwell registered it as a
PA/PAU basic musical work as the earliest date in which damages could be sought. 266
The modernized interpretation of the formula led to the result that issuing the
1960 version of “Handyman” as a record didn’t publish it, but until Jones and
Blackwell filed their PA/PAU registration on the unitary musical work in 1984, they
were not entitled to seek royalties and enforce penalties for infringement. Had they
filed a Form E and submitted sheet music, the same thing would have happened.
But after the 1976 Act there was no reason to prefer sheet music over the submittal
of a cassette tape and a PA/PAU form, as the latter protected both the composition
and the specific sound recording as a unity.
The earthquake came after 1995 in four major cases: La Cienegna Music v. ZZ
Top (California, 1995); Mayhew v. Gusto Records (Tennessee, 1997); Mayhew v.
Allsup (Tennessee, 1999); and ABKCO Music v. LaVerne (California, 2000). All dealt
with a single question: Does issuing a phonorecord “publish” its composition?
In La Cienegna Music v. ZZ Top, John Lee Hooker and Bernard Besman wrote
and recorded “Boogie Chillen” in 1948. 267 Hooker assigned his half of the composition
Rosette v. Rainbow Record Mfg. Co., 546 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976).
The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2544 94th Cong (1976), 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 et. seq.
263 Jones v. Virgin Records, Ltd. et. al., 643 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
264 Id. at 1155 n. 3. The 1984 application was made in the name of CBS Catalog Partnership.
The 1984 basic musical work (PA/PAU) was copyrighted as a derivative of the 1960 composition
pursuant to 17 U.S.C § 409 (9) (1976); 37 C.F.R. §§ 201.5(a)(1)(i), 202.3(b)(1)(ii), 202(b)(2); Jones v.
Virgin Records, 643 F. Supp. at 1159, nn. 16-17. The Boy George version was entitled “Karma
Chameleon,” and used different lyrics.
265 Jones v. Virgin Records, 643 F. Supp. at 1159 n. 13.
266 Id. at 1161.
267 La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top, et. al., 53 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1995).
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to Besman, who registered it as sheet music in 1967 on behalf of his publishing firm,
La Cienega Music. They wrote a second version of “Boogie Chillen” in 1950. Hooker
also assigned this version to Besman, who registered it as sheet music in 1970. A
third version of the song was recorded by Hooker on an album, Canned Heat, in 1970.
It was used with the permission of La Cienega, and was registered in 1992 by
Besman and Hooker.268 In 1973, Z.Z. Top269 released a best-selling song called “La
Grange.” Besman and Hooker alleged that “La Grange” was virtually the same as
“Boogie Chillen.” In subsequent litigation, a lower court determined that “Boogie
Chillen” was in the public domain.270
Z.Z. Top claimed the three versions of the song were published in 1948, 1950 and
1970, the dates they were issued to the public. La Cienega claimed they were
published in 1967, 1970 and 1992, the dates when registration was secured. The
court considered, but declined to follow the Rosette v. Rainbow approach, which
would have adopted the La Cienega dates. 271 The fear of the court was that the
Rosette approach would have given the owner of a pre-1972 sound recording an
incentive to delay registering a work until it was discovered that someone was
profitably infringing it.272 Because copyright duration was then 28 years, a
forthright owner who registered a work got 28 years of coverage, but a disingenuous
owner got unlimited coverage, at least until a successful infringer was discovered.
The owner then registered, starting the 28-year clock. A song like “Boogie Chillen”
would sit in the deep freeze after its initial success, only to have the licensing clock
start after 25 years when Z.Z. Top made it a chart-buster in 1973. Had the song been
copyrighted in 1948, the year it was written and first recorded, its copyright would
have expired in 1976, so La Cienega could have received as few as three year’s
royalties from Z.Z. Top.273
Judge Fernandez’s dissent tried to salvage the Rosette system, which he called
“quite logical, indeed correct.”274 He acknowledged that there was a potential
problem of deliberate delay: “Rosette did not directly speak to the length of protection
under the 1909 Act once an author actually did register. That is a problem which
confronts us and which causes the majority to eschew the Rosette analysis.”275 But
he believed the problem required only a slight tweaking of the system: Use Rosette,
but impose an absolute cap of 28 years after either the date of creation or issuance.
“Thus,” he concluded, “the author who does not register in a timely fashion cannot
artfully extend the time during which he can exploit his work.”276
Having decided that issuing phonorecords publishes the underlying composition,
the court was unable to go any further. If La Cienega had issued the “Boogie
268 The opinion does not specify if Besman and Hooker registered in 1992 for a Form E musical
composition or a Form PA/PAU basic musical work.
269 The name of the band and its corporate entity is “Z.Z. Top,” but inexplicably, the style of the
case reads “ZZ Top,” probably to simplify alphabetization.
270 The lower court decision was unpublished. La Cienega, 53 F.3dat 952.
271 Id. at 953.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 955 (Judge Fernandez, dissenting).
275 Id. Cases during this time period frequently ignored the 1947 Copyright Act, which was a
minor overhaul with no changes to sound recordings, although technically, it did repeal the 1909 Act
in its entirety and replace it.
276 La Cienega, 53 F. 3d at 953.
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Chillen” records in 1948 and 1950 without the required circle-C or circle-P symbols,
they would have fallen into the public domain immediately, according to the
majority. If the required notice had appeared, they would have gone to public
domain status in 1976 and 1978, 28 years after they were issued. The court did not
have this information. Nor did it have any information as to whether the 1970
version (registered only as sheet music and apparently never issued on a record)
complied with copyright formalities. Therefore, it remanded the case back to the
trial court for clarification.277
As Judge Fernandez noted in his dissent, this was a dubious line of argument:
“if a record is not a copy, then placing a copyright notice upon the record itself would
do no good at all because the notice is to be affixed to ‘each copy,’” he explained.
“Thus, under the majority’s view the result is that a record is a publication for the
purpose of divesting the author’s copyright protection in the underlying musical
work, but it would not be a publication for the purpose of investing that musical work
for protection.”278
Section 9 of the old Copyright Act stated that any person entitled to copyright
under the act “may secure copyright for his work by publication thereof with the
notice of copyright required by this Act.” Publishing a book with the circle-C on the
title page invested the book with copyright status. But the White-Smith decision had
said that phonorecords weren’t copies, so Section 9 didn’t apply. But now, the
majority was saying that by issuing a phonorecord, the composition’s copyright was
lost through divestiture. A song’s author was caught in a Catch-22: issuing the song
on a record with the circle-C or circle-P gained nothing, because the notice wasn’t
affixed to “each copy,” but issuing it without the notice lost copyright, because it was
now a divested publication.279
No subsequent decision was ever issued from the district court, so presumably a
settlement was reached. The immediate impact of this case was shock because it was
the first case, after Rosette, to come down squarely for the idea that the compositions
within phonorecords were published when the records were issued to the public,
possibly even to the extent that a later registration of the music as sheet music did
not rehabilitate its rights.
La Cienega was decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in California.
The next case in the line of succession came out of Tennessee in 1977, but never went
beyond the federal district court. It was an opinion almost too odd and convoluted to
Aubrey Mayhew alleged infringement of 42 of his
take seriously.280
country-and-western songs, all from the pre-1972 period. The case was being decided
on a motion for summary judgment. There was only one issue: six records, chosen to

Id. at 954.
Id. at 955.
279 See for example 56 Fed. Reg. 6021 (Aug. 21, 1956) (revisions to 37 C.F.R. § 202, notice
requirements for copyright registration) and 37 Fed. Reg. 3055 (Feb 11, 1972) (revisions to 37 C.F.R.
§ 202, notice requirements for copyright registration). Following the February 15, 1972 revisions to
the copyright code, sound recordings were required to be marked with a circle-P symbol, not a
circle-C symbol. The proper notice procedure did not even exist until adopted by the Register of
Copyright in 1972.
280 Mayhew v. Gusto Records, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1302 (M.D. Tenn., 1997).
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represent the entire group, had been issued without the circle-P symbol. Did that
divest them into the public domain?281
The court briefly considered Rosette, which it mildly denigrated, and ZZ Top,
which it mildly complemented. But to reach its decision, it turned to a case decided
eighteen years earlier by the Sixth Circuit and never published, Leeds Music Corp. v.
Gusto Records.282
Leeds v. Gusto involved a spoken-word comedy routine by Ray Pinkston entitled
“Phone Call from Heaven.” It was apparently a recorded improvisation; Pinkston
never prepared a written transcription of the routine, nor submitted one for
copyright. This presented a problem under the 1909 and 1947 copyright acts.
Performances of dramatic works on phonorecords were covered in Section 1(d);
musical works in the following Section 1(e). The language in Section 1(d) made it
plain that dramatic performance records, just like musical records, were not copies of
the texts from which they were taken.283 Unlike music, dramatic performance
records didn’t have a mechanical royalty system to compensate authors for the use of
their writings.284 On the other hand, Section 1(d) did permit a copyrighted dramatic
work, “not reproduced in copies for sale,” to be sold as “a manuscript or any record.”
Thus, if the text of the dramatic work was copyrighted, selling a sound recording of a
written dramatic work was protected as a “reproduction.” 285 But if one were in the
position of Ray Pinkston, who never copyrighted his text, the fact that a phonorecord
was not a copy of the text, but did publish the text, meant that releasing one’s own
record threw one’s work into public domain status.
The Leeds v. Gusto court first tried to deal with the problem by determining that
phonorecords were copies. It did this by suggesting that the contrary holding was a
creature of Judge Gurfein’s opinion.286 This was wrong. Judge Gurfein had merely
reiterated the holding from the Supreme Court’s old White-Smith v. Apollo decision.
281 There was a second issue concerning whether Mayhew’s application for copyright term
extension was valid, but it was mooted by the decision on the first issue.
282 Leeds Music Corp. v. Gusto Records, Inc., No 75-284 (M.D. Tenn., Jan. 19, 1977); Leeds Music
Corp. v. Gusto Records, Inc., 77-1177, 1979 LEXIS 13834 (6th Cir. 1979). Many references cite to
Leeds Music Corp. v. Gusto Records, Inc., 601 F.2d 589 (6th Cir. 1979), but this is merely a table
entry. The LEXIS citation returns a two-paragraph sixth circuit slip opinion (77-1177) containing
mainly excerpts from the middle district court of Tennessee (75-284) opinion. For all intents and
purposes, the district court opinion, 75-284, is not available. Sometimes Judge Campbell in the
Mayhew v. Gusto Records published opinion quotes from the Leeds district court case (75-284),
sometimes from the Leeds circuit court slip opinion (77-1177), and sometimes from the circuit court
opinion quoting the district court slip opinion. Given the extensive reliance on the use of these
unpublished cases, it is hard to understand why Judge Campbell did not choose to reproduce at least
the district court opinion (75-284) as an appendix, unless he did not want it available for the reader
to compare to his decision.
283 See Copyright Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 391, 61 Stat 652, 80th Cong. (1947) (“Any person
entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive right: (d)
To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a drama or, if it be a dramatic work
and not reproduced in copies for sale, to vend any manuscript or record whatsoever thereof; to make
or to procure the making of any transcription or record thereof . . . .”).
284 Copyright Act of 1947, § 1(e), Pub. L. No. 391, 61 Stat 652, 80th Cong. (1947).
285 Copyright Act of 1947, § 1(d), Pub. L. No. 391, 61 Stat 652, 80th Cong. (1947).
286 See Mayhew, 960 F. Supp. at 1307 (“[The district court judge in Mayhew v. Gusto] specifically
disagreed with Judge Gurfein’s holding that that a sound recording could not under then-existing
law be a “copy” of the existing law.”)
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Knowing it was shaky ground, the Sixth Circuit dropped this line of reasoning and
came up with a more imaginative approach that apparently originated with the
district court; because Pinkston had never written down “Phone Call from Heaven” in
any form, even manuscript, his studio tape was not a copy, it was an original. 287
What was then distributed, presumably, were thousands of copies of the original.
Ergo, it was in the public domain. The new rule, as the Leeds v. Gusto court stated
it, was: “Where, as here, the original work is itself a sound recording, the sound
reproduced from it, being in the same medium as the original are, in every sense of
the word, ‘copies’ of the original.”288
What this meant was that if a record contained a song that was performed off a
written composition, issuing records to the public did not publish the composition
because the records were not copies. It did not matter if the composition was
copyrighted, only if it was written. On the other hand, if the song was a pure
improvisation, issuing copies of the records did publish it. (Keep in mind that we are
only talking about recordings made before February 15, 1972.) Returning to Mayhew
v. Gusto Records, the court said little more than “Leeds v. Gusto established
precedent in the Sixth Circuit, so we have to go with it.” 289
At this point, Congress finally had enough of the whole issue and stepped in.
Marybeth Peters, Assistant Register of Copyrights, told the House Subcommittee on
Intellectual Properties in late 1995 that “what this case [La Cienega] does is, say, if a
recording was released before 1978290 and if that recording did not contain the proper
copyright notice, and I can tell you that probably 99.9% did not, that musical
composition went into the public domain.” 291 Senator Orrin Hatch noted on the floor
of the Senate that “since the Supreme Court has denied cert. in La Cienega, whether
one has copyright in thousands of musical compositions depends on whether the case
is brought in the Second or Ninth Circuits. This is intolerable.”292
A new subpart (b) was added to Section 303 of the Copyright Act that said that
“the distribution before January 1, 1978 of a phonorecord shall not for any purpose
constitute a publication of the musical work embodied within.” 293 So much for La
Cienega v. ZZ Top and Mayhew v. Gusto. But, not so fast.

287 Id. Apparently originated with the district court: Leeds. v. Gusto Records, No 77-1177, 1977
LEXIS 13834.
288 Id. (citing Leeds v. Gusto, No 75-284 (M.D. Tenn., Jan. 19, 1977)).
289 Id. Mayhew v. Gusto Records is eight pages long and has one headnote. It apparently
stumped the annotators as well.
290 Ms. Peters was in error: the vital legislative change was made with the 1972 amendments,
not the 1978 comprehensive re-write. See Sound Recordings, limited copyright, Pub. L. No. 92-140,
85 Stat. 391, § 1(a) (adding a new § 1(f) to the then-current copyright code). Nevertheless, the
subsequent change was written using the 1978 date. Paradoxically, records made between 1972 and
1978 can be copyrighted as to both their composition and their sound recording element; and rules
for affixing their circle-P copyright notice on published copies were issued in the Code of Federal
Regulations for six years, but they can’t legally be published.
291 Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property on H.R. 1861:
Technical Corrections to the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1994, 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of
Marybeth Peters).
292 104 Cong. Rec. S11301 (Oct. 28, 1997) (Passage of H. R. 672).
293 Pub. L. No. 105-80, § 11, 111 Stat. 1534, 105th Cong. (1997).

[15:1 2015]
From the Statute of Anne to Z.Z. Top:
51
The Strange World of American Sound Recordings, How it Came About, and Why it
Will Never Go Away

Aubrey Mayhew had initiated another suit, this time against Tommy Allsup,
before the new law became effective and it made it all the way to the Sixth Circuit. 294
Mayhew asserted that “A Big Ball in Cow Town” was written in the mid-1940’s by
Hoyle Nix, copyrighted as sheet music in 1968, and sold to him, Mayhew. The
Allsups, to the contrary, claimed that the song entered the public domain in either
1949 or 1958 when Nix released it on records issued on those dates, both lacking the
circle-C or circle-P. On September 25, 1997 the district court granted summary
judgment to the Allsups. On November 13, the new Section 303(b) took effect. Three
weeks earlier, on October 9, Mayhew had filed a motion to alter or amend the
September 25 order. It did not bring up the issue of the new legislation. It was
denied on November 21.295
Normally, new laws can’t be applied retroactively, but when Congress writes one
with the specific intent of making it retrospective, that’s another story. The issue
was thus whether the change in law was intended to be applicable retroactively. The
rule is that the language in the legislation itself is dispositive unless it fails to
indicate any intent one way or the other. But the new Section 303(b) was clearly
retroactive in intent. In fact, it couldn’t be anything but retroactive: the only things
impacted by it had to exist prior to January 1, 1978, and be subject to an activity
(distribution) that occurred before that date.296 The court naturally determined that
the new law was retroactive in effect.
Of the three judges, only Judge Wellford had any comment about the ongoing
legal controversy. He believed the facts of Leeds v. Gusto, upon which Mayhew v.
Gusto was based, contained fundamentally different facts (probably because it was a
dramatic, and not a musical work), so had the legislative change not mooted the
question, he said he would have come down in favor of Rosette and against ZZ Top.297
But this proved to be an issue that simply refused to die. In 2000, more than
two years after the Section 303(b) amendment, the Ninth Circuit (home of the ZZ Top
opinion) heard ABKCO Music v. Laverne.298 The dispute this time was over some
older Rolling Stones tunes, “Love in Vain” and “Stop Breakin’ Down.” They had
originally been composed and recorded by bluesman Robert Johnson in 1937.
Originally issued by Vocalion, they were re-released in the early 1960s by a successor
firm, Columbia, on LP and in 1990 on CD.299
The Stones versions were issued on records in 1969 and 1972 and were
copyrighted in 1970 and 1972 as sheet music as derivatives of public domain songs.
Columbia had paid royalties to the Johnson estate based on state-law copyright.
ABKCO (owners of the Stones versions) declined to recognize the Johnson
common-law copyrights. The Johnson estate registered copyright on the Columbia
releases in 1991 with Columbia’s consent and demanded a license for use of the songs
from ABKCO. ABKCO filed suit for declaratory relief on November 9, 1995, at a time
the House of Representatives was considering adding the Section 303(b) change to

Mayhew v. Allsup, 166 F.3d 821 (6th Cir 1999).
Id. at 822.
296 Id. at 824.
297 Id. (J. Wellford, concurring)
298 ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Laverne, 217 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2000).
299 Id. at 686.
294
295
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the Technical Corrections to the Satellite Home Viewer Act. 300 (The change was not
implemented until early 1997.) ABKCO asserted that the compositions were
published in 1938-39 when the Johnson records were issued and their copyright
lapsed for failure to file for renewal (Johnson died in 1939). 301
ABKCO argued that Section 303(b) could not be applied retroactively. In this
case, the lawsuit had begun, but had not yet concluded, when the change in
legislation was approved. The general rule is that a legislature cannot reverse a law
in order to change the outcome of pending litigation. 302 On the other hand, a law
that merely clarifies an existing policy is acceptable. There was little or no precedent
in dealing with a law whose very nature was to implement a retroactive policy so as
to intentionally create two chronologically distinct categories of rights-holders in
property.
The court noted that “there is good argument that the 1997 amendment simply
clarifies what the meaning of the 1909 Act was all along; namely that the
distribution of phonorecords did not constitute publication.” 303 In addition, “the
policy of the Copyright Office has always been that distribution of a phonorecord
before 1978 does not publish the underlying musical composition, and Rosette was
the only procedural interpretation until ours in 1995 [La Cienega].”304 Moreover,
“section 303(b) would make no sense if it were to be applied solely prospectively,
because it explicitly applies to conduct occurring before January 1, 1978.” 305 (This
was the Mayhew v. Allsup argument, and was cited thusly.) 306
The Circuit Court remanded the case back to the district court because the
copyright status of the Johnson songs was still unclear and additional facts were
needed. But at last, the question of whether the release of a pre-1972 phonorecord
“published” the underlying composition under federal copyright had been put to rest.
VIII.
On March 1, 1989, the United States joined the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.307 Although the legislative report issued
with Berne Convention Implementation Act stated that “the provisions of the Berne
Convention . . . do not expand or reduce any right of an author of a work, whether
claimed under Federal, State or common law,” 308 it was unclear what happened if the
right came from outside the Copyright Act.
300 Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property on H.R. 1861:
Technical Corrections to the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1994. The amendments were part of the
satellite home viewer act, but it was not passed until 1997: Pub. L. No. 105-80, § 11, 111 Stat. 1534,
105th Cong. (1997).
301 ABKCO Music, Inc., 217 F.3d at 686.
302 Id. at 687.
303 Id. at 690-691.
304 Id. at 691.
305 Id. at 692.
306 Mayhew, 166 F.3dat 824.
307 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886 (completed
Mar. 20, 1914; revised July 14, 1967), S. Treaty Doc. 99-27, 99th Cong (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-568, 102 Stat 2854, 100th Cong. (1988).
308 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2008) (Historical and Revision Notes).
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ITAR-TASS News Agency v. Russian Kurier, was litigated in 1998.309 The
details are not terribly important: the Russian news bureau TASS accused Kurier, a
small, Brooklyn-based Russian-language weekly newspaper of copying its
material.310 The relevant facts were: 1) the TASS material originated in Russia; and
2) the infringement, if any, took place in Brooklyn. Almost every aspect of the case
turned on whether Russian or American copyright law should apply. A lower court
had determined that Russian copyright law should apply. There was a factual
dispute over whether Russian copyright law gave rights in published newspaper
articles to authors or newspapers. The lower court determined that Russian law was
ambiguous, and that the rights to the articles should belong to the newspapers on
general equitable grounds. Thus, the newspapers were entitled to damages. 311
The appellate court rejected the district court’s decision because it failed to start
with what it saw as the basic threshold determination: whose law should apply? The
lower court had assumed Russian law from the beginning. The circuit court rejected
this as an a priori assumption. Under the Berne Convention, an author of a member
nation is entitled to the same copyright protection in all other nations as in his home
state. Despite this, Melville and David Nimmer had argued that “the applicable law
is the copyright law of the state in which the infringement occurred,” not the author’s
home or the place where the work was first published. 312 Judge Newman, who wrote
the appellate opinion, was unhappy with both the trial court and the Nimmers’
formulation because it didn’t break “applicable law” down into its (supposedly) two
components: ownership and scope of rights.
Normally, one would think that Russian law should be applied, because, as the
Berne Convention states, a work should be treated in the U.S. as in Russia. Not so,
according to Judge Newman. He ruled that “the treaty does not supply a choice of
law rule for determining ownership [of an intellectual property].” Thus, the choice of
law rule defaults to that of the jurisdiction where the court sits, i.e. the United
States. The general rule under U.S. law is that the jurisdiction with “the most
significant relationship to the persons and parties” determines the law that is to be
used. Again, Russian law. Again, not so fast. Judge Newman declared an exception:
if one has “an exclusive right under a copyright” pursuant to section 501(b) of the
1976 Copyright Act, “including one determined according to foreign law,” then
American law shall be used.313
But wait. Section 501(b) is the basic “standing” requirement under the
Copyright Act.314 Unless one can meet that condition, either directly (holding an
ITAR-TASS Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 84.
311 Id. at 88.
312 Id. at 89; MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.05 (since
amended). Patry, the author of the other leading treatise, had submitted an amicus brief arguing
that the Berne Convention contained no choice of law element at all: it did not direct the use of any
national law, only equal treatment between domestic and foreign authors. ITAR-TASS v. Russian
Kurier, 153 F. 3d at 89, n. 8.
313 ITAR-TASS v. Russian Kurier, 153 F. 3d at 92.
314 See 17 U.S.C § 501 (2000) (“(a) Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 121 . . . or who imports copies of phonorecords
into the United States in violation of section 602 is an infringer of the copyright . . . (b) The legal or
beneficial owner of an exclusive right under copyright is entitled . . . to institute an action for any
infringement . . . .”).
309
310
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American copyright) or indirectly (holding a foreign copyright of a fellow Berne
Convention member), the minimum threshold for bringing suit in federal court is not
satisfied and that case will be dismissed at the start. Judge Newman had created a
clever Catch-22: if you can’t meet section 501(b), you can’t get in the door of the
courthouse for lack of standing, and if you can, your ownership rights will be
determined by American law, because anything that meets 501(b) is an exception to
the general choice of law rule. Judge Newman went through an elaborate ritual of
applying Russian law, but the criteria under Section 501(b) states that one must be a
legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright, and Newman
determined that nothing under Russian law gave anything comparable to an
exclusive copyright under United States law. In other words, the issue wasn’t
whether the newspaper articles were protected under Russian law, but whether the
Russian newspapers had standing to be in an American court. 315
Frankly, the entire line of argument was nothing but an elaborate way of
justifying Nimmers’ rule: “The applicable law is the copyright law of the state
[nation] in which the infringement occurred, not that of the state [nation] of which
the author resides, or in which the work is first published.” One might also add: “the
Berne Convention be damned.”
ITAR-TASS was a tortured-logic case twisted around to achieve a specific
outcome: if the author of a foreign work claims protection in the United States under
her home nation’s copyright laws via the Berne Convention, and alleges infringement
in the United States, her case will be considered under United States law. In other
words, although the Berne language claims that she is “entitled to the same
copyright protection in other member states as in her home nation,” in the United
States that means she will be “entitled to the same copyright protection as any other
American author under similar circumstances.” The critical difference between
Capitol v. Naxos and ITAR-TASS was that the doctrine was shifted from a conflict
between foreign and American copyright law (ITAR-TASS) to a conflict between
foreign and New York state law (Capitol v. Naxos).
Commenting later on the Capitol Records v. Naxos case, Naxos International
CEO Klaus Heymann said that the most important factor in the case was that his
lawyers had given him bad advice.316 He may be right.
In 2000, three years before the case, Naxos was similarly sued by the
Metropolitan Opera of New York.317 Naxos of America, a New Jersey corporation
doing business in Nashville, was a wholly owned subsidiary of hnh, Ltd., the actual
corporate name for the Hong Kong based firm known as “Naxos International.”
Naxos of America distributed CDs, DVDs and other products made in Asia, Europe
and America by hnh, Ltd. Naxos of America also acted as a distributor for CDs
produced by third parties.318 The CDs in dispute were Metropolitan Opera
performances from 1935 to 1945 that were sold worldwide by hnh, Ltd., but not in the
315 For a more in-depth (and somewhat indignant) review of Judge Newman’s analysis, which is
somewhat at odds with my own, see MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 17.05 (2012).
316 NICHOLAS SOAMES, THE STORY OF NAXOS: THE EXTRAORDINARY STORY OF THE INDEPENDENT
RECORD LABEL THAT CHANGED CLASSICAL RECORDING FOREVER, 118 (Piatkus Press, 2012).
317 Metropolitan Opera Assn. v. Naxos of America, et. al., 98-CIV-7858 (DAB), 2000 LEXIS 9834
(July 18, 2000).
318 SOAMES, supra note 316, at 369-375.
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United States. They were not advertised in the Naxos of America catalog, but were
listed in the hnh.com website. However, the hnh.com website, while containing
information about the various Naxos brand products, lacked the capacity to accept
orders. Naxos of America at this time sold its goods primarily in others’ retail stores
and by mail order.319
The Metropolitan Opera served process only on Naxos of America. Naxos of
America argued that the District Court for the Southern District of New York was an
improper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 because “it has never intentionally or
mistakenly sold, offered for sale, or distributed any of the disputed CDs to a New
York customer, whether at the wholesale, retail or direct consumer levels. Nor have
they offered the disputed CDs to a New York market via print advertisement or
through an Internet Website.”320
All of the substantive issues are missing, because they are irrelevant to the
matter at hand. Upon what law was the alleged infringement based? Where was it
alleged to have occurred? Because the motion to dismiss was based on improper
venue, and because neither party sought a transfer to a more suitable venue under
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), resulting in dismissal, it is impossible to know if the reference to
New York was based on a claim by the Metropolitan Opera to state law copyright, or
if the claim to a lack of New York contacts was asserted because it was the minimum
argument needed to advance a motion to dismiss for improper venue. 321 In any
event, the court held that “plaintiff simply has not carried its burden of establishing
that venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).”322
Naxos’s New York City lawyers learned a lesson; but it was the wrong lesson:
don’t worry about substantive law, get it dismissed quickly, and don’t be overly
bothered about jurisdiction or choice of law. In fact, venue proved to be the
dispositive question in the subsequent Capitol v. Naxos litigation: had the case been
moved to the Middle District of Tennessee, it probably would have been over in six
months.
In the subsequent Capitol v. Naxos litigation, Capitol Records filed in diversity
in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York. 323 Four specific
recordings by violinist Yehudi Menuhin, cellist Pablo Casals and pianist Edwin
Fischler, recorded between 1931 and 1939 were cited by the plaintiff.
The
Gramophone Company later became part of EMI, an affiliate of Capitol. Although
the British copyrights for the last of these recordings expired in 1986, EMI asserted
that its 1930’s contracts with the artists gave it “absolute, world-wide and perpetual”
ownership of the recordings. Capitol licensed all the common-law copyrights in the

319 Id. at 118, 336. However, one could hear brief excerpts of each recording, but according to
Heymann, this technology was still crude in 2000. Id.
320 Metropolitan Opera v. Naxos, 98-CIV-7858, 2000 LEXIS 9834. In fact, hnh, Ltd. asserted
that the only copies transferred to America were seven copies mistakenly shipped from Hong Kong
to a retailer in New Jersey. Id.
321 SOAMES, supra note 316, at 116. Klaus Heymann, who is not a lawyer, implies the latter:
that the Met sought to litigate over distribution anywhere in the U.S. and simply filed in the wrong
state — one where no colorable activity took place. Id.
322 Metropolitan Opera v. Naxos, 98-CIV-7858, 2000 LEXIS 9834.
323 Capitol v. Naxos I, 262 F. Supp.2d at 207.

[15:1 2015]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

56

recordings in America through an agreement executed with EMI in 1996, ten years
after the last British copyright expired.324
Unlike the Metropolitan Opera case in 2000, Capitol claimed that the allegedly
infringing records were distributed by Naxos of America across the United States,
beginning in 1999. They had been produced by an hnh, Ltd. affiliate in England 325
by dubbing the best available shellac copies. These turned out to be discs made in
the U.S. in the 1930s by Victor under license to the Gramophone Company. 326 They
were then converted into digital format using studio playback hardware and noise
reduction software.
There are several puzzling aspects to the case. Federal jurisdiction was asserted
by Capitol through diversity. But normally, in diversity, the appropriate venue is
either the district of the defendant’s place of business or the venue most proximate to
the place where the events giving rise to the cause of action occurred.327 As the
Second Circuit Court later put it, “the District Court and the parties have assumed,
correctly in our view, that the relevant state law is that of New York, the jurisdiction
where the alleged infringement occurred,” but the actual language of the complaint
alleged that Capitol’s rights were being violated “under the laws of New York and the
several states,”328 indicating that Naxos was infringing the common-law copyright in
every state where such rights existed. Under such circumstances, a motion for
transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) would likely have succeeded.329 Instead, Naxos’s
attorneys moved to dismiss.330
Judge Sweet chose to convert Naxos’s motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment. The court held that the English copyrights had all expired by
1936, and that Capitol could not establish a contractual chain of ownership to any
newer derivative or restoration work emanating from the original. 331 Naxos never
advertised its re-issues as a duplicate of the original Gramophone Company product.
Its packaging noted only the composer, performers, and date of recording. Thus,
there was no element of unfair competition. 332 The motion for summary judgment
was granted in favor of Naxos, but the decision gave Capitol twenty days to submit
additional factual material.333
Capitol did so. After receiving this material, Judge Sweet issued a second
opinion (Capitol v. Naxos II) affirming and supporting his first. 334 The Capitol v.
Naxos II decision expanded on the court’s earlier grounds for finding that Capitol did
Id. at 206-207.
SOAMES, supra note 316, at 309-316. The affiliate was named K&A productions, in Potters
Bar, London.
326 Capitol v. Naxos I, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 208. The U.S. Victor origin of the dubbed records was
not an issue in the litigation.
327 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) (2013); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2013).
328 Capitol v. Naxos I, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 207.
329 See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2013) (“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying
venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer
such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”). Why didn’t they?
Probably because the lawyers were all in New York City.
330 Capitol v. Naxos I, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 207.
331 Id. at 212.
332 Id. at 213-214.
333 Id. at 216.
334 Capitol v. Naxos II, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
324
325
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not have ownership to any derivatives or restorations of the Gramophone Company
originals and that Naxos did not attempt any actions that met the definition of unfair
competition. It did little to expand or clarify the issue of what state-based copyrights
Capitol owned in the recordings.335 As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals later
stated, neither opinion addressed the issue of whether Capitol had a common-law
copyright in the original recordings, stating only that “the facts are inadequate to
support Capitol’s claim of intellectual property rights in the original recordings.” 336
The Second Circuit was more systematic, but also more problematic. It went
into great length to identify a specific, pre-publication state common law copyright in
sound recordings that it claimed was a creature of the Supreme Court’s Goldstein
ruling and Section 301(c) of the copyright code. In fact, it was really a reversion to
1955’s Capitol Records v. Mercury Records.337
In Capitol Records v. Mercury Records, Judge Dimock had to struggle under the
rules of decision act to justify the application of New York state law. However, this
time, ITAR-TASS handed the court the choice of law on a platter: since there was no
applicable United States law, New York state, as the site of the court of jurisdiction,
would provide it.338
But was there in fact no United States law? Section 301(c) of the copyright code
blocked the preemptive effects of Section 301(a); until February 15, 2067, a state is
free to implement any of the protections normally reserved for Section 106 of the
copyright code. But nowhere is it stated that a state must fill the void left by the lack
of federal protection. The State of New York did have its own version of an
anti-piracy statute, Chapter 275 of the Penal Code, but it was strictly a criminal
statute (as was true in Goldstein); it didn’t make any provision for a private right of
action or the recovery of damages. 339 Thus, the Second Circuit dismissed it as the
source of the state-law copyright in Naxos. The New York law that protected the
Capitol recordings was a non-statutory common-law copyright. It filled the entire

335 See Capitol v. Naxos II, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 480-481 (“As previously held, the facts are
inadequate to support Capitol’s claim of intellectual property rights in the original recordings. The
English copyrights in the agreements have long since expired, there is ambiguity Capitol’s chain of
title, and Capitol appears to have waived or abandoned any interest it had in the recordings.
Furthermore, Naxos did not compete unfairly under New York law. Naxos did not attempt to sell
identical copies . . . .”).
336 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America, Inc. (Capitol v. Naxos III), 372 F. 3d 471, 476 (2nd
Cir. 2004).
337 Id. at 478-479; Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2nd Cir.).
338 Capitol v. Naxos III, 372 F. 3d at 477. Note how a foreign treaty, the Berne Convention, is
being used to provide a choice of law rule in a purely domestic matter, appropriate venue in
diversity.
339 N.Y. Penal Code § 275.05 (1996) (“Manufacturing of unauthorized recording in the second
degree. A person is guilty of the manufacture of unauthorized recordings in the second degree when
such person: (1) knowingly, and without consent of the owner, transfers or causes to be transferred
any sound recording, with the intent to rent or sell, or cause to be rented or sold for a profit, or used
to promote the sale of any product, such article to which such recording was transferred, or (2)
transports within this state, for commercial advantage or private gain, a recording, knowing that
the sounds have been reproduced or transferred without the consent of the owner; provided,
however, that this section shall only apply to sound recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972.”).
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void left by the lack of federal copyright,340 and because of footnote 28 of the
Goldstein case, it even survived publication:
In looking to New York’s common law, we need to make clear that the
phrase “common law copyright” has a broader meaning as applied to
sound recordings than it has applied to most other forms of
intellectual property. For most forms of intellectual property, a
common law copyright was generally said to refer to an author’s
property right in his creation before publication. However, when the
Supreme Court considered the scope of state law authority over
copying sound recordings, which were not protected by federal statute
in 1972, the court made clear that state authority was not limited to
pre-publication protection. As the court explained [in Goldstein]
federal law makes the concept of publication relevant only to federal
copyright law, and states can determine for themselves whether
publication has any such relevance to copyright protection for works,
such as pre-1972 sound recordings, to which Congress has not
extended the federal copyright statute. . . . Thus, as a result of
Goldstein and Section 301(c), it is entirely up to New York to
determine the scope of its common law copyright with respect to
pre-1972 sound recordings.341
It is true that in footnote 28 of Goldstein, Chief Justice Burger wrote that
“‘publication’ serves only as a term of the art which defines the legal relationships
which Congress has adopted under the federal copyright statutes. As to categories of
writings which Congress has not brought within the scope of the federal statute, the
term has no application.”342 It is also true that within the context it was stated, the
Chief Justice believed that pre-1972 sound recordings were things that “Congress has
not brought within the scope of the federal statute.” But was that still applicable?
In 1997, after La Cienega and the two Mayhew cases, where the ninth and sixth
circuits held that issuing a pre-1972 phonorecord published the composition it
contained,343 Congress had added the new Section 303(b) that directed that “The
distribution before January 1, 1978 of a phonorecord shall not for any purpose
constitute a publication of the musical work embodied thereon.” 344 Note that the
subsection does not say “composition,” it says “musical work,” which is the term used
in Section 102(2), but is not otherwise defined in the 1976 Copyright Act. However, it
appears to be the post-Berne Convention conception of the unity of a sound recording

340 To be precise, the Second Circuit said that New York could fill as much of the void as it
wanted to fill. See Capitol v. Naxos III, 372 F. 3d at 478 (“[I]t is entirely up to New York to
determine the scope of its common law copyright with respect to pre-1972 sound recordings.”).
341 Capitol v. Naxos III, 372 F.3d at 478.
342 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 570 n. 28.
343 La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top, et. al., 53 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1995); Mayhew v. Gusto
Records, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1302 (M.D. Tenn, 1997); Mayhew v. Allsup, 166 F.3d 821 (6th Cir.
Tenn. 1999).
344 17 U.S.C. § 303(b), as amended by Pub. L. No. 105-80, § 11, 111 Stat. 1534 105th
Cong. (1997).
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and composition.345 Thus, after 1997, the determination of what was or was not
“published” was not a matter left to state law. A state could not determine that
distribution of a phonorecord before 1978 published the composition, and probably
could not hold that it published the sound recording either. It could only hold that
these elements were not published. This was the result of a mandate that came from
federal law.
However, Judge Newman was not free to rule on the most significant point of
law, whether the expiration of the copyright of the four recordings in the U.K.
precluded any claim to copyright under New York state law. He noted that neither
the Berne Convention nor the Universal Copyright Convention applied to sound
recordings, and the treaty that did apply (the Convention for the Protection of
Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication) did not apply to
phonorecords made before March 10, 1974. 346 If any of these three had been
applicable, the “rule of the shorter term” would have been used, meaning that the
common law copyright would have expired when the home nation copyright expired.
But he could not determine this because the relevant law was New York state law,
which had no direct precedent to guide him. He therefore certified the question to
the New York Court of Appeals to decide if the expiration of the copyright term under
U.K. law terminated the common-law copyright in New York.347
Judge Victoria Graffeo was assigned the Second Circuit’s certification. Her
opinion was an extended treatise on the 400-year history of common-law copyright.348
However, in making a few theoretical points, she overlooked or neglected some basic
judicial mechanics. She stated that Capitol’s complaint was based on New York law
because that was the situs of the alleged infringement. 349 However, Capitol never
asserted a location-specific jurisdiction. They always claimed jurisdiction based on
federal diversity, and never, in any brief submitted to the federal district or circuit
courts, did they claim that the alleged copying or distribution ever took place in New
York.350
Judge Graffeo started her analysis with the Statute of Anne. It was a fairly
straightforward historical rendition until she got to the 1909 White-Smith piano roll
case. At that point she backtracked and stated that “Despite the fact that sound
345 The primary difference is in section 106 of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1)-(6) (2010).
Owners of sound recordings have the right of reproduction, the creation of derivative works, and the
right of distribution by sale or other means. Additionaly, after 1995, owners of sound recordings
have the right of digital audio transmission, if the sound recording is copyrighted. Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings 995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 2, 109 Stat. 336 (1995). The
owners of musical works have these rights plus the right of performance and display (but not the
digital audio transmission right.) See also Copyright Office circulars 56 and 56A, supra note 10.
346 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886 (completed
Mar. 20, 1914; revised July 14, 1967), S. Treaty Doc. 99-27, 99th Cong. (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341; Convention for the Protection of
Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms, 25 U.S.T.
309 (1974). See also MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.08[A],
Appendix 29 (2012).
347 Capitol v. Naxos III, 372 F.3d at 484.
348 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America (Capitol v. Naxos IV), 830 N.E. 250 (N.Y. 2005).
349 Id. at 253.
350 Capitol v. Naxos III, 372 F.3d at 471, “Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiff-Appellant,”
2003 WL 24174551; “Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant,” 2004 WL 3559566. They did imply it, but
never stated it outright as an asserted fact.
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recordings could not be ‘published’ under federal law they were eligible for state
common-law protection.” In support of this, she did not cite White-Smith itself, but
Justice Thompson’s dissent in Wheaton v. Peters.
In fact, the majority in
White-Smith had said only that piano rolls were not copies because they were not “a
written or printed record of it in intelligible notation.” They were, instead,
replaceable parts of a machine; change the part, a different tune comes out. 351
Wheaton v. Peters is cited only once in White-Smith itself, for the unremarkable
proposition that there is no common-law federal copyright.352 Understandable, given
that Wheaton v. Peters was decided three-quarters of a century before the first
phonograph was sold. However, Thompson’s dissent in Wheaton v. Peters, which is
far longer than the main opinion, is the principal basis for the “cupcake theory”: that
federal copyrights are merely a set of rights that are slathered on top the more
important state common-law copyrights, and that when federal copyrights expire, the
perpetual state common-law copyrights remain.353
Judge Graffeo used Wheaton v. Peters as a springboard for a lengthy analysis
that has been heavily criticized because it bounced indiscriminately back and forth
between cases dealing with two different issues: does the issuance (“publication”) of
phonorecords prior to 1972 divest the owner’s right to the sound recording; and does
it divest the owner’s right to the composition contained on the recording? As we have
seen, these are very different issues, each with their own history and law, but Graffeo
seemingly mixed them together indiscriminantly. 354
The Waring cases and RCA v. Whiteman from the 1930s; Metropolitan Opera v.
Wagner-Nichols (1950); Capitol Records v. Mercury Records (1955); Goldstein (1973);
Rosette v. Rainbow Records (1976); even the La Ciegnena and Rolling Stones cases
from the 1990s—Graffeo threw them all into the rhetorical pot. It seemed at first
reading to create a nonsensical mishmash. But if you dig deeper, you can discern in
Judge Graffeo’s legal ping-pong a common theme: The effect of Goldstein was more
than an affirmation of a given states’ right to enact criminal laws prohibiting music
piracy. It was an overarching philosophy of federalized copyright law clearly derived
from a rejection from the Wheaton opinion. 355
In other words, Judge Graffeo held that Goldstein overturned Wheaton v. Peters
and adopted the dissent of Justice Thompson. The 1769 vote of the House of Lords in
Donaldson v. Beckett never applied to the United States. The Constitution was not,
and is not, the fundamental source of copyright. It is a power that rightfully belongs
to the states. The federal government, through the Progress Clause, has the power to
add or even replace state copyright for a “limited time.” But whenever and wherever
the federal government does not expand to fill the entire range of powers available to
the states, they have the freedom to fill that void:
state common-law copyright protection can continue beyond the
technical definition of publication in the absence of contrary statutory
authority . . . because the federal Copyright Act did not protect
musical recordings, state common-law could supply perpetual
Capitol v. Naxos IV, 830 N.E.at 258; White-Smith,28 Sup. Ct.at 321.
White-Smith, 28 Sup. Ct. at 322.
353 Capitol v. Naxos IV, 830 N.E.at 258, n. 5.
354 Id. at 258-259.
355 Id. at 261.
351
352
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copyright protection to recordings without regard to the limitations of
“publication” under the federal act . . . given that the copyright
protection extended by state common law to sound recordings not
covered by the federal Copyright Act is similar to the scope of
common-law ownership rights in other forms of property, which can
exist indefinitely.356
And this meant that in a decision resting on a choice of law, the State of New
York should be treated as sovereign, equivalent to other foreign powers that exercise
the power of copyright. Applying essentially the same logic as the Second Circuit,
Judge Graffeo determined that no “rule of the shorter term” applied. The Berne
Convention357 and Universal Copyright Convention 358 had a “rule of the shorter
term,” but they didn’t apply to sound recordings. The Phonograms Convention only
applied to recordings fixed after March 10, 1974. The Uruguay Round Agreement
Act359 didn’t apply to United Kingdom sound recordings in the U.K. public domain
prior to 1996.360
When does copyright end? Thus far in the analysis, there were two possible
answers. The first was that it never existed: the federal government left the records
unprotected, so there was nothing to compare to United Kingdom copyright. This
was assumed in Capitol v. Naxos I and II, but never seriously entertained in Capitol
v. Naxos III or IV. The second answer was that under New York law, forever. 361
State common-law was perpetual. However, Judge Graffeo acknowledged a third
answer: February 15, 2067. On that date, the block against federal preemption in
§301(c) of the copyright code will expire. While there is much uncertainty about what
exactly will happen on that date, Judge Graffeo was unambiguous in her belief that
under the law as it now exists, the recordings will pass out of the copyright domain of
the State of New York.362
Because she was considering specific questions of law certified to her by the
Second Circuit, Judge Graffeo was not required to reach ultimate conclusions on
many of the issues of the case. For example, she never actually stated that Naxos
infringed on Capitol’s copyrights. Agreeing with Judge Newman of the Second
Circuit that Chapter 275 of the New York Penal Code could not be used to sustain a
356 Id. at 261, 265. Almost, but not completely. One question Judge Graffeo did not comment on
is the issue of perpetuity: when federal copyright expires, as it must under the “limited times”
restriction of the Progress Clause, does state law copyright “spring back,” or has it been cut off by
the imposition of federal copyright? She stated that “Until 2067 no federal or state statutory
impediment constricts this common-law durational component for pre-1972 sound recordings.
Id. at 265. However, as discussed above, 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) does not impose an end of term of
copyright; it merely ends a statutory block against the imposition of federal preemption against
state powers equivalent to federal copyrights. While sound recordings may pass out of state law
control in their present form in 2067, where they will go is very uncertain.
357 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886 (completed
Mar. 20, 1914; revised July 14, 1967), S. Treaty Doc. 99-27, 99th Cong (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
358 Universal Copyright Convention, 25 U.S.T. 1341 (July 24, 1971); Convention for the
Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms, 25
U.S.T. 309 (1974).
359 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 103rd Cong. (1994).
360 Capitol v. Naxos IV, 830 N.E.at 265.
361 See supra note 356.
362 Capitol v. Naxos IV, 830 N.E.at 265.
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private right of action for copyright infringement, she cited an uncodified session law
from 1786 to establish the elements of tortious copyright infringement in New York.
A copyright infringement cause of action in New York consists of two elements: (1)
the existence of a valid copyright; and (2) unauthorized reproduction of the work
protected by the copyright. 363
She also added that “New York provides common-law copyright protection to
sound recordings not covered by the federal Copyright Act, regardless of the public
domain status in the country of origin, if the alleged act of infringement occurred in
New York.”364 She never followed up this statement with a conclusion as to whether
the condition was met. Either she lacked the necessary facts or chose not to exceed
the charge she had been given by the Second Circuit. It is clear that hnh, Ltd. did
not reproduce any of the CDs that were the subject of the controversy in the United
States365 so, in accordance with either New York law or the 1973 Goldstein decision,
it is very unlikely that Naxos could have infringed on Capitol’s New York State
non-statutory, common-law copyright.
According to Klaus Heymann, Naxos and EMI reached a settlement after the
case was returned from Judge Graffeo’s court to the circuit court. No damages were
sought, but Naxos agreed to withdraw all the Gramophone Company-based historical
recordings from the United States. 366 Looking back several years later, Heymann
told an interviewer:
There are about one million classical collectors in the world who buy
ten CDs a year. That is how I define a serious collector. There are
about 100,000 titles available, physically or digitally, so it means that
every title sells on average 100 times: 100 copies per title per year.
So what happens if 200,000 titles become available: will the collectors
buy twenty CDs? No, they will buy ten. This means that average
sales will drop to fifty—and that doesn’t work commercially. That is
the conundrum for the whole industry. An enormous number of
recordings are sitting in archives and could be accessed now (and
increasingly, they are). The BBC, the Norddeutsche Radfunke, the
Süddeutsche Rundfunk, Swedish Radio, and all the other national
broadcasters in Europe—they all have huge archives and keep
producing hundreds of new recordings every year. Then there are the
major record companies with their archives of more than 200,000
album-length masters. If that stuff ever becomes available, who will
buy it? . . . The recording industry was trying to shut the stable door
after the horse had bolted.367

363 Id. at 266. I must rely on Judge Graffeo’s opinion; I cannot locate anything in New York law
older than its first codification in 1813.
364 Id. (emphasis added)
365 NICHOLAS SOAMES, THE STORY OF NAXOS: THE EXTRAORDINARY STORY OF THE INDEPENDENT
RECORD LABEL THAT CHANGED CLASSICAL RECORDING FOREVER, 362 (Piatkus Press, 2012).
366 Id. at 118.
367 Id. at 115, 118-119.

